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1 Introduction and summary 
This case study provides an overview on protracted displacement in the Horn of Africa and aims to uncover 
evidence on transnational and translocal connectivity and mobility of displaced populations in the region. 
The case study contributes to the elaboration of the working paper “Protracted Displacement in the post-
WWII period” in the framework of the three-year project “Translocal Figurations of Displacement” 
(TRAFIG), which is financed by the European Union within the Horizon 2020 work programme (Societal 
Challenge 5 ‘Europe in a changing world’; call MIGRATION-08-2018 ‘Addressing the Challenge of Forced 
Displacement’). 
The objective of this case study is to review academic and literature issued by relevant actors in the field 
of protracted displacement such as international organisations, NGOs or governments to answer the 
questions whether and how transnational and translocal connectivity and mobility contributes to self-
reliance and resilience of displaced populations, both internally and across borders, in the region. In 
addition, the study looks at policy responses to protracted displacement in the Horn of Africa.  
For the purpose of this study, the Horn of Africa includes Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, South 
Sudan and Sudan. These countries are all members of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development 
(IGAD), a regional economic community formed to promote regional cooperation and integration to add 
value to its Member States’ efforts in achieving peace, security and prosperity. When drawing on figures 
of protracted displacement, the study follows UNHCR’s definition of a protracted refugee situation “as one 
in which 25,000 or more refugees from the same nationality have been in exile for five consecutive years 
or more in a given asylum country” 
(UNHCR, 2018c, p. 22). When 
drawing on specific examples from 
the literature, a wider definition of 
protracted displacement is applied, 
following TRAFIG’s definition of 
protracted displacement situations 
“as situations in which the 
capability of displaced persons to 
rebuild their lives after 
displacement and the opportunities 
available to do so are severely 
limited for prolonged periods of 
time, in other words, in situations 
where (more durable) solutions are 
not available or progress towards 
achieving these is stalled” (Etzold, 
et al., 2019, p. 22). 
This case study is structured as 
follows: section two provides an overview on protracted displacement in the region. It describes the four 
main protracted displacement situations in the region1: The Eritrean refugee crisis, the displacement of 
Somalis internally and across borders and the South Sudanese and Sudanese protracted and emergency 
refugee and IDP situation. The third section identifies main patterns and selected examples in six 
                                                             
1 Created by Jelena Jokic, ICMPD; the map refers to protracted refugee situations, i.e. excluding IDPs, see footnote 2 for an explanation on 
the calculation of those in protracted refugee situations.  
Figure 1: Protracted refugee situations in the Horn of Africa 
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dimensions of transnationalism and translocality, namely the emergence and existence of 
transnational/translocal communities and diasporic links, mobility patterns such as secondary movements, 
return or resettlement, family dynamics of displaced populations, emerging transnational economic 
spaces, social remittances, i.e. the circulation of ideas, behaviours, identities and social capital, and 
transnational political spheres. The fourth section summarises policy responses to protracted displacement 
in the Horn of Africa and major policy shifts while studying two cases, namely the emergence of 
encampment in Kenya and the envisaged phasing out of camps and facilitating refugee’s access to work in 
Ethiopia.  
2 Protracted displacement in the Horn of Africa 
With an estimated 217 million inhabitants (UN, Population Division, Department of Economic and Social 
Affairs, 2017), the HOA currently hosts over 8.5 million forcibly displaced persons, including over 6 million 
IDPs and about 2.5 million refugees and asylum seekers. The main factors for displacement are war, conflict 
and insecurity, amplified by environmental factors such as droughts, governance failures, compulsory 
military service and lacking economic conditions (UNHCR, The World Bank Group, 2015; Davy, 2017; IOM, 
2017; Marchand, Reinold, & Dias e Silva, 2017). Out of the 2.5 million refugees, an estimated 1 million live 
in protracted displacement, when applying the definition of protracted displacement lasting for five years 
or longer. IDPs are not considered here as “calculating the number of IDPs in protracted displacement, 
whether displaced by conflict or disasters, is not possible with the data available” (Crawford, Cosgrave, 
Haysom, & Walicki, 2015b, p. 9). 







































hosted in the 
region 
Djibouti 927,414 3019 - 26,895 97 23,404 76 
Eritrea 4,846,976 564,447 - 2,392 281,961 2,392 167,974 
Ethiopia 99,873,033 221,030 1,078,000 891,990 73,278 888,911 27,956 
Kenya 47,236,259 13,250 159,000 488,368 3898 435,187 2738 
Somalia 13,908,129 810,283 825,000 29,231 554,040 18,175 519,437 
South 
Sudan 
11,882,136 2,446,277 1,899,000 285,295 1,306,203 268,191 75,497 
Sudan 38,647,803 746,663 2,072,000 924,789 31,6473 899,690 206,905 
Total 217,321,750 4,804,969 6,033,000 2,648,960 2,535,950 2,535,950 1,000,583 
                                                             
2 Column 1 (UN, Population Division, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 2017); column 2, 4, 5, 6, UNHCR figures as of mid-2017 
(UNHCR, 2018e); column 3, includes the total number of persons displaced by conflict and violence; no data is available on Djibouti and 
Eritrea (IDMC, 2018); column 7: figures were estimated using the UNHCR Population Statistics Database including data until 2017 and a) 
based on the definition of protracted displacement as five years or longer, b) by looking at the refugee flows between the six HOA countries 
of origin and countries of refuge pairs from 2012 to 2017 and c) excluding asylum-seekers and IDPs. Based on the 2015 ODI study “Protracted 
displacement: uncertain paths to  self-reliance in exile” by Nicholas Crawford, John Cosgrave, Simone Haysom and Nadine Walicki, the 
following two assumptions were used: a) it was assumed that no refugees were returning from a particular country of refuge to a particular 
country of origin in a particular year and being replaced by other refugees from that country of origin in that year and b) it was assumed 
that, when refugees returned, it was the most recently displaced refugees that returned rather than those that had been in displacement 
the longest (UNHCR, 2018e). 
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Looking at forced displacement across borders within the region, table 1 shows that all countries in the 
region are both origin and host countries for refugees from other countries in the region. Displacement 
situations in the region have lasted for over 20 years and the concentration of protracted refugees and 
IDPs is one of the highest in the world. The region is also characterised by mixed migration and the 
countries simultaneously host IDPs, refugees, returnees, victims of trafficking, as well as labour migrants 
(UNHCR, The World Bank Group, 2015).  
While all HOA countries are affected by protracted displacement, Somalia and South Sudan stand out as 
the main countries of origin in the region while Ethiopia, Kenya and Sudan are the main host countries, 
based on the most recent data available. It is important to note however, that displaced populations from 
the seven focus countries also live in other major host countries outside the region, as data in table 3 
suggests.  
Ethiopia is the second-largest refugee hosting country in Africa, after Uganda (UNHCR, 2019a).3 By mid-
2018, there were 921,000 refugees in Ethiopia, mainly from Somalia (256,400), Eritrea (169,900), Sudan 
(43,800) and South Sudan (445,000) as the top origin country. Most of the increase from 2017 was due to 
refugees from South Sudan. According to a recent study, most Eritrean and Somali refugees in Ethiopia are 
living in protracted displacement. The majority of refugees live in camps situated near the borders of their 
respective countries of origin with small numbers living in urban areas, mainly Addis Ababa and Mekele 
(UNHCR, The World Bank Group, 2015). Ethiopia has generally been following a strict encampment policies 
and refugees are mostly accommodated in 26 camps under police protection. As of the introduction of the 
“Out of Camp Policy” in 2010, Eritrean refugees are allowed to live in urban centres if they have the 
necessary means to financially support themselves (MGSoG, 2017b). The recent 2019 refugee 
proclamation introduces free movement and better access to work and education (see sub-section 4.2.2). 
Ethiopia also has a high number of IDPs, both old and new displacement, due to inter-communal and cross-
border violence in addition to drought as a major driver of displacement that is nevertheless difficult to 
isolate from other driving factors (IDMC, 2019). A high proportion of IDPs is also estimated to live in 
protracted displacement situations (UNHCR, The World Bank Group, 2015; Maru, 2017). 
Kenya has for a long time been one of the top refugee host countries globally and still hosts close to half a 
million refugees and asylum seekers from Somalia, South Sudan, Ethiopia and other countries. The decline 
is mainly due to the decrease in the number of Somali refugees to 251,400 refugees meaning that Kenya 
was no longer the largest host of Somali refugees by mid-2018 as it was at the end of 2017 (UNHCR, 2019a). 
New refugees in 2018 were generated by the conflict in South Sudan which also affected Kenya. Due to the 
government’s official encampment policy refugees are mainly located in the Dadaab complex, which used 
to be the largest refugee settlement in the world with a population corresponding to Kenya’s fourth largest 
city, in addition to Kakuma. Informal settlements of refugees and asylum seekers in cities across Kenya, 
mainly in Nairobi, have also occurred and are generally accepted. Settlement in Nairobi and other urban 
areas is allowed under special circumstances only. Most refugees live in situations characterised as 
protracted, being in camps for long periods of time without access to higher education, employment or 
travel (MGSoG, 2017c). IDMC estimates indicate a stock of 159,000 IDPs by the end of 2017 (no UNHCR 
data is available) and also these estimates are considered outdated and not reliable (IDMC, 2018). The 
stock of IDPs includes people displaced post-election violence in 2007–08 which can hence be defined as 
protracted, in addition to new displacements from 2017 and before caused by intercommunal clashes. 
Displacement related to elections is a recurring issue in Kenya with approximately 300,000 displaced in 
1992; 150,000 in 1997; 20,000 in 2002; and over 660,000 in the 2007 post-election violence. Most are 
                                                             
3 Data from UNHCR, mid-2018; data not comparable with data in table 1 which is, for reasons of comparability, from 2017.  
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referred to as “integrated IDPs”, referring to those living outside camps, especially after the official closure 
of camps in 2010, but not necessarily have found a durable solution (Kamungi, 2013). 
Sudan is the third-largest country of asylum in Africa with, by mid-2018, a population of 908,700 refugees. 
The majority of these refugees are from South Sudan (772,700), followed by Eritrea (108,200), Syria 
(11,200) and Chad (7,500) (UNHCR, 2019a).4 Refugees from Eritrea are mostly living in situations 
characterised as being protracted and UNOCHA estimates that there are 155,000 refugees living in 
protracted situations across the country mostly in camps in East Sudan. Out of these 58 per cent were born 
in Sudan and people have reported to live in protracted displacement for 14 years in Darfur (UNHCR, The 
World Bank Group, 2015; MGSoG, 2017f; UNOCHA, 2018). Generally, refugee data has to be treated with 
caution, as data by the Sudanese Commission for Refugees (COR) and UNHCR significantly differs. This is 
due to the fact that a large number of refugees and asylum seekers are unregistered, including Syrian and 
Yemeni people who are not obligated to register as refugees upon arrival in Sudan. The COR estimates that 
there are approximately 2 million refugees and asylum seekers living in Sudan (UNOCHA, 2018). A large 
proportion of these is estimated to be residing in urban areas with limited access to assistance and services, 
despite the government’s strong encampment policies limiting refugees’ freedom of movement (MGSoG, 
2017f). 
Although the description on the situation in major refugee host countries might reveal that displacement 
is a rather recent phenomenon since the 1990s or even later, the region has been continuously affected by 
displacement. While a brief historical review will not be able to take into account the complexities of 
displacement in the region, some general patterns can be identified after WWII.  
During the struggles for and after independence (Kenya became independent in 1963, Djibouti in 1977 
and Sudan 1956) of the former colonies in Africa political domination of one ethnic group over another, 
coups and attempted coups caused displacement in a number of cases. In the 1960s, the civil war in Sudan, 
which lasted for seventeen years (1955-1972), caused large number of refugees, mainly to Uganda, and 
internally displaced (UNHCR, 2000b; Di Bartolomeo, Thaibaut, & Perrin, 2012). The Sudanese military 
entered on several occasions in the early 1960s border areas in Uganda and Ethiopia to return “their 
refugees” to Sudan as they believed rebel groups would exploit refugees (and hence benefit from them) 
(Loeschner & Milner, 2005). After the end of the war, large number returned to their country or region of 
origin (UNHCR, 2000b; Holborn, 1972). In Kenya, Asians have been the target for hostile outbreaks as they 
controlled large parts of the economy (UNHCR, 2000b). Conflict between Ethiopian forces and separatists 
in the province of Eritrea resulted in an influx of refugee into Sudan.  
During the late 1970s and early 1980s several large-scale displacements took place in the Horn of Africa, 
caused by a renewal of East-West tensions, superpower rivalry and external manipulation of civil conflicts 
and famine. At the end of the 1970s, Ethiopians sought refuge in Somalia, and to a smaller extent in 
Djibouti, after Somalia’s president Siad Barre of Somalia invaded the Ogaden region in Ethiopia in 1977. 
Refugees were mainly accommodated in large camps. Further refugee movements to Somalia took place 
between 1984 and 1986 while also a large number returned to Ethiopia.  
Refugees from Eritrea, before 1993 formally being a part of Ethiopia, arrived in Sudan as of 1962 because 
of armed struggles for the right to self-determination. Also refugees from other parts of Ethiopia fled to 
Sudan from the prolonged revolution and the violent and oppressive military regime of Mengistu after the 
overthrow of the autocratic regime of Haile Selassie in 1974. The number of Ethiopian refugees, mostly 
from Eritrea, in Sudan grew from 200,000 in 1977 to over 400,000 by the end of 1978 when the Ethiopian 
government started a major offensive of Eritrean opposition forces and grew even further in the 1980s. In 
                                                             
4 Data from UNHCR, mid-2018; data not comparable with data in table 1 which is, for reasons of comparability, from 2017. 
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1984, the famine caused 300,000 refugees from Ethiopia, the majority from Tigray but also from the 
Eritrean parts, entering Sudan between October 1984 and March 1985. At that time, the Wad Sherife 
refugee camp with 128,000 refugees was one of the largest in the world. While many Tigrayans returned, 
most of the Eritreans had to stay while fighting and continued famine in Eritrea led to new influxes of 
Eritreans into Sudan. Caused by the re-outbreak of the war in 1983 in southern Sudan between the Sudan 
People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) and government forces, many Sudanese fled to the Gambela region of 
Ethiopia. In 1987–88, a large number of Somalis also fled to Ethiopia to escape fighting between Somali 
government forces and rebels seeking independence for northwest Somalia (UNHCR, 2000b). 
In the 1990s, intensified conflict in addition to drought and famine in Somalia resulted in massive 
displacement and by mid-1992 some two million people had been displaced as a result of the conflict, 
including some 400,000 who went to Ethiopia and over 200,000 who went to Kenya (UNHCR, 2000b). As a 
result by the war between Ethiopia and Eritrea 68,000 people were expelled to Eritrea for being nationals 
of an enemy state and neither of the two countries was willing to accept full responsibility for them as 
citizens. In 1996, the tensions in the Great Lakes also affected the HOA with deteriorating relations 
between Uganda and Sudan (UNHCR, 2000b). By 1999, Ethiopia was among the major refugee hosts with 
nearly 260,000 refugees, including over 180,000 Somalis, some 70,000 Sudanese, and around 5,000 Kenyan 
refugees. Kenya by that time hosted some 224,000 refugees with the largest groups being Somalis (some 
140,000) and Sudanese (some 64,000). Sudan hosted over 390,000 refugees, including over 340,000 
Eritreans and some 35,000 Ethiopians. Most of the Eritrean refugees have been in Sudan since before 
Eritrea gained independence in 1993. Sudan had also produced some 475,000 refugees as a result of its 
long-running civil war (UNHCR, 2000b). 
 
Figure 2: Number of people in protracted displacement from the region in the region5 
 
 
Based on the figures created to estimate the number of persons in protracted displacement from the region 
in the region, there are seven situations classified as PDS as shown in the table below. 
                                                             










Djibouti Eritrea Ethiopia Kenya Somalia Sudan South Sudan
Djibouti Eritrea Ethiopia Kenya Somalia South Sudan Sudan
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Main types of conflict leading to 
displacement 
Eritrea Ethiopia 2009 63,771  Border conflict with Djibouti 
Sudan 1991 103,176  War for independence,  
 Border war with Ethiopia 
during 1998-2000 
 2010 Eritrean–Ethiopian 
border 
 Political, social and economic 
oppression and the 
mandatory military service 
 religious and ethnic 
discrimination (GSDRC, 2016) 
Somalia Ethiopia 1987 223,031  Civil war that lea to the 
collapse of President Siad 
Barre’s regime in 1991 
Kenya 1991 281,692  Efforts to remove Siad Barre 
from power,  conflict spread 
to Puntland and South 
Central Somalia 
 Drought in 1991 and 1992 




Ethiopia 2012 58,715  South Sudanese civil war, 
2013 
 Conflict between the 
Sudanese Armed Forces 
(SAF) and the Sudan People's 
Liberation Movement-North 
(SPLM-N) 
 internal conflict (especially in 
Jonglei State) 
Sudan Ethiopia 1983-1990 
1992-2008 
2010 
27,175  Second Sudanese civil war 
(1983-2005) 
 War in Darfur, starting in 
2003 








 Fighting in southern areas of 
Sudan (UNHCR, 2012) 
These situations can be summarised as follows (UNHCR, The World Bank Group, 2015; Marchand, Reinold, 
& Dias e Silva, 2017; UNHCR, 2018c): 
1. The Eritrean refugee crisis; 
                                                             
6 Columns 1-3 are based on (UNHCR, 2018c, p. 23); the table only displays PRS within the region and hence does not consider PRS of Somalis 
in Yemen; data, contrary to the narrative description of the four PDS situations the table only considers refugees and excludes IDPs; column 
4 is based on own calculations, see footnote 2.  
7 See footnote 2 on explanations on the estimation of persons in protracted displacement. 
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2. The displacement of Somali internally displaced persons (IDPs) and Somali refugees; 
3. The South Sudanese protracted and emergency refugee and IDP situation; 
4. The Sudanese protracted and emergency IDP and refugee situations. 
While these four situations of protracted displacement have been selected for the purpose of this paper, 
other (underreported) cases of protracted displacement exist in the region. These include, but are not 
limited to, the situation of IDPs in Ethiopia living in protracted displacement situations due to inter-
communal and cross-border violence, in addition to severe environmental incidents as well as the situation 
of internally displaced in Kenya referred to as “integrated” but nevertheless unresolved.  
According to UNHCR, these protracted refugee situations mostly have a long history (with the exception of 
South Sudan given its relatively recent independence in 2011) as the overview below shows: 
 
Textbox 1: PDS I: The Eritrean refugee crisis 
Displacement in and from Eritrea has been an issue already since the Eritrean War of Independence, 
which lasted from 1961 to 1991, and continued with President Isaias Afwerki’s authoritarian regime. It 
reached another peak during the border conflict with Ethiopia between 1998 and 2000 and has been 
fuelled by the fact that more and more people have sought to escape their indefinite enrolment in the 
national service programme and the absence of economic and social opportunities within the country 
(MGSoG, 2017a; Research and Evidence Facility, 2017). 
Approximately half of the Eritrean refugees and asylum seekers stay in the region, mainly those who 
leave immediate hardships of rural areas of the country and often possess limited social and economic 
capital, with Sudan and Ethiopia being the main host countries in the region. Studies suggest that those 
who fleeing the country with high aspirations tend to move onwards with no inclination to remain in 
refugee camps in neighbouring countries (Research and Evidence Facility, 2017). 
Those who live in camps in Ethiopia are reported to have low levels of self-reliance due to low 
educational attainment despite high literacy rates; availability of jobs limited to the construction sector, 
petty trading, or with NGOs and refugee-serving organisations; and lacking social and business 
connections to communities outside the camps as well as a limited connectedness to urban markets 
within the camps (Research and Evidence Facility, 2017; Samuel Hall Consulting, 2014). Some Eritreans 
have benefited from the Ethiopian Government’s “Out of Camp Policy” which allows them to live in 
urban centres provided they have no criminal history and have the financial capacity to do so. In 2019, 
the government passed a new refugee proclamation granting considerably more rights to refugees, 
including freedom of movement (see sub-section 4.2.2). Despite Ethiopia’s intention in this regard is said 
to be aimed at preparing refugees for productive livelihoods when they are eventually able to return to 
Eritrea, results seem to be mixed with some staying in the informal sector with limited legal protection 
while others move on. 
In Sudan, approximately 107,000 Eritrean refugees are reported to live in situations of protracted 
displacement (UNHCR, The World Bank Group, 2015). Many Eritreans seem to bypass the refugee camps 
in Eastern Sudan and travel directly to Khartoum although they are formally not allowed to leave the 
Shagareb camp. An important factor contributing to protractedness (and limiting opportunities for local 
integration) identified in the literature is that those leaving Eritrea now are not of the same ethnic group 
as those who fled Eritrea before the 2000s as these communities were able to move throughout Eastern 
Sudan without being detected (Research and Evidence Facility, 2017). 
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Regarding internal displacement, there is a lack of recent data and it is unclear how many of those 
displaced internally because of the War of Independence, the border conflict with Ethiopia and 
environmental issues such as droughts are still living in displacement (MGSoG, 2017a). 
 
Textbox 2: PDS II: The displacement of Somali internally displaced persons (IDPs) and Somali refugees 
Displacement out of Somalia has mainly been generated since the collapse of the state in 1991 before 
which Somalia was itself a major hosting country for an estimated 650,000 Ethiopian Somalis from the 
1977-78 border war with Ethiopia. Internal displacement has been relevant at least since the 1970s, 
when Somalis have been displaced due to conflict, natural disaster, and economic hardship. Since the 
regime collapse in 1991, Somali refugees and internally displaced persons have remained the most 
consistently protracted displaced population in the Horn of Africa (Hammond, n.d.). The period between 
1995-2005 showed relatively low levels of displacement due to low levels of violence, a lack of 
humanitarian crisis (and assistance). Mass displacement since the 2011 famine in Somalia resulted in 
movements towards Mogadishu and an expansion of IDP camps in the capital and outwards migration 
towards Kenya and Ethiopia. The situation of IDPs can largely be described as protracted characterised 
by extreme vulnerability to violence and militia exploitation due to a lack of security and aid (Research 
and Evidence Facility, 2017). 
Generally, one can note that protracted displacement situations which began in the 1990s have been 
overlaid by new crises and changed considerably because of policy changes in Kenya and agency by the 
affected population (Lindley & Haslie, 2011). In addition, many communities have further suffered 
multiple displacements (UNHCR, The World Bank Group, 2015). 
While the situation of Somalis in Kenya’s Dadaab complex can be described as protracted to a large 
extent, many refugees have moved to urban areas despite restrictions and de-facto integrated 
economically (Lindley & Haslie, 2011). By the end of 2015, it was reported that in Kenya more than 
424,000 Somali refugees lived in protracted displacement while in 2017, only about 280,000 Somali 
refugees are still counted to live in the country (UNHCR, The World Bank Group, 2015). Overall, the 
number of Somali refugees globally slowly declined to 954,700 by the middle of 2018, mostly due to 
returns from Kenya following the Tripartite Agreement Governing the Voluntary Repatriation of Somali 
Refugees Living in Kenya between Kenya, Somalia and UNHCR (UNHCR, 2019a; MGSoG, 2017d). 
Nevertheless, the number in Ethiopia increased slightly to reach 256,400 and became the largest Somali 
refugee population by mid-2018. 
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Textbox 3: PDS III: The South Sudanese protracted and emergency refugee and IDP situation 
The South Sudanese refugee emergency is described the largest refugee crisis in Africa in current times 
although literature on South Sudan displacement is sparse. 
Before December 2013, there were 114,470 South Sudanese refugees while by mid-2018 South Sudan 
has become the third-largest source country of refugees with over 2,2 million (UNHCR, 2019a, p. 41). 
The conflict in South Sudan continued to displace people with 111,700 new refugees in the first half of 
2018 only. Besides the internationally displaced, 1,8 million South Sudanese were reported to be 
displaced internally (UNHCR, 2019a, p. 10). Generally, South Sudanese migrants tend to stay in the 
region instead of engaging in onward migration. The main destination countries are Sudan, Uganda, 
Ethiopia and Kenya. 
Literature reveals the following reasons which potentially could also provide some guidance for further 
research on factors affecting protracted displacement: on the one hand the favourable refugee 
environment in Uganda as one of the main countries of asylum for South Sudanese refugees, a lack of 
resources to be able to pursue longer distances, the majority of South Sudanese refugees being women 
and children as the men tend to stay behind to fight in the conflict, and resettlement of refugees mainly 
to United States, Canada, UK and Australia as well as the possibility of family reunification (MGSoG, 
2017e). 
Displacement in South Sudan is a consequence of protracted internal and external conflicts, i.e. with 
Sudan, internal conflicts over natural resources, attacks by the Lord’s Resistance Army, instability in 
neighbouring countries and the ongoing South Sudan Civil War (UNHCR, The World Bank Group, 2015).  
A study shows that 366,000 South Sudanese have returned from Sudan since 2010 but no returns have 
been documented since 2012. Large numbers of refugees and returnees are reported to live in 
vulnerable urban settings. Insecurity and lack of access to land, services, or livelihood opportunities have 
complicated the pursuit of durable solutions (UNHCR, The World Bank Group, 2015). 
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Textbox 4: PDS IV: The Sudanese protracted and emergency IDP and refugee situations 
Conflict, mainly the two Sudanese civil wars between 1955-1972 and 1983-2005, have caused massive 
displacement of Sudanese citizens, both internally and externally. After the Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement (CPA) in 2005 and the independence of South Sudan in 2011, Sudan has been combating 
rebels from the Sudan People's Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N). These conflicts have resulted in 
three major displacement situations in Sudan: the Three Areas (Abyei, Blue Nile State, and Southern 
Kordofan/Nuba Mountains), Darfur, and East Sudan (UNHCR, The World Bank Group, 2015). 
Sudanese refugees are mostly in Chad, South Sudan and Ethiopia. Sudanese in Egypt are not required to 
register as refugees, based on the bilateral free movement agreement, which results in extreme 
variations of estimates about the numbers (MGSoG, 2017f). 
By mid-2018 there were approx. 2 million internally displaced (UNHCR, 2019a, p. 20) while in 2015 over 
3 million had been reported (UNHCR, The World Bank Group, 2015, p. 22). The number of IDPs is 
constantly changing significantly and is expected to increase, as estimated by UNHCR, due to the 
protracted nature of conflict. According to a 2015 study, the majority of displaced are in a state of 
protracted displacement in urban and peri-urban areas with large numbers of IDPs living in the larger 
cities of the country, and particularly around Khartoum and Omdurman (UNHCR, The World Bank Group, 
2015; Research and Evidence Facility, 2017). The situation is amplified by constant insecurity and 
resuming conflicts which makes return to the areas of origin difficult or leads to the fact that returnees 
are being displaced again (UNHCR, The World Bank Group, 2015; IDMC, 2018). In addition, 
environmental and climatic factors contribute to the protractedness of Sudanese refugee and IDP 
situations as on the one hand famine, desertification, drought and flooding is a driver for forced 
displacement and, on the other, negatively affects the livelihoods of displaced populations in and 
outside camps (Research and Evidence Facility, 2017).  
Statelessness is another major issue contributing to the vulnerability of the Sudanese population as the 
separation of Sudan and South Sudan has resulted in the loss of citizenship for as many as half a million 
people of mixed heritage (Musinguzi, 2012). 
 
While studies on the global displacement situation reveal that most protracted displaced populations live 
outside of refugee camps and organised IDP camps (Crawford, Cosgrave, Haysom, & Walicki, 2015a), the 
situation in Sub-Sahara Africa is reported to be an exception with refugees predominantly residing in camps 
(Crawford, Cosgrave, Haysom, & Walicki, 2015b). Figures on the region confirm this finding with 65 per 
cent residing in camps, see figure 3 below. 
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Figure 3: UNHCR Populations of concern in the region by type of accommodation (2016) 8 
 
Similarly, global figures suggests that the majority of UNHCR refugees live in urban settings (at least 59 per 
cent) while only Sub-Saharan Africa has a clear majority of the caseload in rural settings (Crawford, 
Cosgrave, Haysom, & Walicki, 2015b). Again, the data on the HOA confirms this finding with 76 per cent of 
UNHCR populations of concern residing in rural areas. Nevertheless, there are some general differences 
when comparing the data on the countries of refuge in the region. The available data suggests that 
especially in Kenya, Somalia and Sudan significant numbers of displaced reside in urban areas but it can be 
assumed that unofficial figures are considerably higher, mainly in Khartoum, Darfur and Nairobi. Literature 
also suggests that there are large populations of displaced in Juba (UNHCR, The World Bank Group, 2015). 
Figure 4: UNHCR Populations of concern in the region by type of location (2016) 9 
 
While there is some evidence of stronger self-sufficiency of refugees in urban areas (e.g. among Ethiopian 
and Somali refugees in Kenya) due to the possession of social capital, literature does not find general 
correlations between the percentage of the caseload in protracted displacement and the proportion in 
either individual accommodation or in urban settings (Crawford, Cosgrave, Haysom, & Walicki, 2015a; 
Crawford, Cosgrave, Haysom, & Walicki, 2015b). Generally, few studies are available on urban 
displacement in the region and cover mostly the national capitals, e.g. Nairobi with regard to the expansion 
of the Eastleigh neighbourhood because of large numbers of Somali who have settled there (Research and 
Evidence Facility, 2017). 
Key messages 
                                                             
8 The figures are based on UNHCR’s statistical yearbook 2016 and include UNHCR’s populations of concern, including refugees, asylum 
seekers, returned refugees and IDPs, IDPs, stateless persons and others of concern; the notion of camps includes planned/managed camps, 
self-settled camps as well as transit/reception camps; the population by type of accommodation or location does not add up to the total 
population of concern in the region by end 2016 but is very close (variation below 1 per cent), (UNHCR, 2018a) 
9 See footnote 8 above on the data source 
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 The Horn of Africa is highly affected by mass displacement since WWII. With the exception of 
Djibouti, all countries in the region are countries of origin and asylum at the same time. 
 Out of the 40 protracted refugee situations listed by UNHCR in 2017, seven were in the region. The 
countries of origin of these reported situations are Eritrea, Somalia, South Sudan and Sudan. 
 All countries in the region, with the exception of Djibouti, are also affected by mass internal 
displacement and protracted IDP situations although data on IDPs is generally less robust. 
 A recent study showed that more than 80 per cent of refugee crises last for ten years or more and 
also countries with conflict-induced internal displacement reported IDP figures that last for 23 
years on average (Crawford, Cosgrave, Haysom, & Walicki, 2015a). Also in the region, the 
protracted refugee situations last between 32 and (up to date) seven years.  
 The main reasons for mass displacement across borders were conflict and war, leading to (internal) 
displacement as well as exacerbating and prolonging displacement situations. Studies found that 
environmental factors undermine the resilience of displaced populations and hence increase the 
likelihood of protractedness.  
 It is also notable that protracted and new displacement situations exist simultaneously and hence 
should not be viewed as static. Literature reveals that while a situation may be protracted, such as 
the Dadaab refugee camp, not all of its residents are in protracted displacement (Crawford, 
Cosgrave, Haysom, & Walicki, 2015a). 
 The region is an exception as it does not represent the general trend of urbanisation of 
displacement with most of the (official) figures reporting that a majority of displaced live in rural 
areas, mostly in camps. Nevertheless, some research on urban displacement and the greater self-
reliance of displaced in urban settings exists without some general findings showing the 
correlation between the likelihood of protractedness and the type of location.  
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3 Translocal and transnational dimensions of displacement 
This section focusses on the strategies and practices of displaced populations and their communities in 
responding to situations of prortractedness, emphasising the role of translocal and transnational networks, 
connections and mobility. The concept of transnationalism highlights the fundamental role of social, 
cultural, economic and political cross-border connectivity and networks. People’s identities, social 
practices, ways of belonging and daily life activities are not considered to be bound to one place or nation 
only, but grounded in network relations that form transnational spaces (Dahinden, 2017; Levitt & Glick 
Schiller, 2004). Deriving from transnationalism, translocality puts emphasis on the specific places, rather 
than nations, that migrants are situated in and which are at the same time connected to others (Porst & 
Sakdapolrak, 2017; Etzold, 2017; Milner, 2014). 
The underlying question of this section is whether the transnational and translocal networks and 
trajectories provide a solution to protracted displacement for the individuals, families or groups in 
question. Acknowledging the vulnerabilities these connections and mobility can cause, it nevertheless 
places the focus on the positive contributions of transnational and translocal connectivity, networks and 
mobility to the livelihood opportunities of displaced populations. The section hence aims to identify 
examples of (positive) coping mechanisms in the economic and social spheres that persons in protracted 
displacement make use of while also aiming to identify the characteristics of those individuals, groups or 
families that are unable to make use of positive coping mechanisms. Generally, a large body of literature 
emphasises the relevance of diasporas residing outside the region for development and livelihood 
opportunities of communities in the region which is why examples are also included that go beyond the 
HOA region (Research and Evidence Facility, 2017). 
3.1 Translocal/Transnational communities and diasporic links 
All seven countries of study have large diaspora communities within and outside the region. Interestingly, 
refugees from Djibouti and Kenya, countries that are politically relatively stable, are much more likely to 
reside outside Africa, especially in the United States and European countries, as shown in table 3 below 
(Marchand, Reinold, & Dias e Silva, 2017). 
 
Table 3: Top Host Countries of Refugees and Asylum Seekers from the Horn of Africa, 201710 


















































































                                                             
10 Data from 2017, including refugees (including refugee-like situations) and asylum seekers, (UNHCR, 2018e). 
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Generally, very few studies exist on the transnational links and networks between countries and locations 
of origin and destinations within the region. Information about translocal connections is almost non-
existent, except to some extent for (Somali) refugees in Kenya. If availably, they predominantly cover links 
and networks of people originating from Somalia (e.g. residing in Kenya, or analysing ethnic 
groups/populations from specific regions or clans displaced to border regions in Ethiopia, Djibouti and 
Kenya (Hammond, n.d.)). In addition, some studies also examine the transnational links between diaspora 
communities outside the region and those residing in the region, e.g. in refugee camps such as the Dadaab 
complex, and their importance for sustaining the livelihoods of those residing in the region. Nevertheless, 
the long time span of people living in exile and the pressure on livelihoods of those residing outside the 
region affects the continuity and amounts of sending remittances. In order to reduce the dependency, 
diaspora communities support self-sufficiency and migration outside the region (Horst, 2007). More 
literature exists on the identity formation and transnational activities of communities from the HOA region 
residing in countries of the Global North, mainly in Scandinavian countries or the US (see sub-section 3.6 
below).  
Studies on borderland communities offer useful insights on translocal connections in the region, not 
primarily focussing on displaced populations but including them. These communities form and are 
embedded in transnational and translocal networks and spaces, depending also on the nature of the border 
in question. Drawing on case studies in the HOA and Eastern Africa, Feyissa and Hoehne (2010) show that 
connections and mobility detail resources that can be extracted from borders and borderlands, including 
economic resources such as cross-border trade and smuggling, import businesses and currency exchange 
and status and rights resources by enabling people to make claims for citizenship and refugee status.11 An 
example of the latter are Ethiopian Nuer, moving between Ethiopia and Sudan, who joined the refugee 
camps in Gambella constructed for Southern Sudanese Nuer in order to access education opportunities. A 
similar case is the one of the Zigula who initially came to Somalia as slaves from Tanzania and were looked 
down upon by the ethnic Somali. They were able to use their preserved language skills and, as a result, 
were in the position to make use of opportunities in the refugee camps in Kenya in a better way than the 
other Somali ethnicities (Research and Evidence Facility, 2017; Feyissa & Hoehne, 2011). The border 
between Ethiopia and Eritrea on the other hand is a ‘harder’ one (at least until 2018) with official 
communication being cut off between the two countries, including physical border crossings as well as 
trade relations, postal and telecommunications exchanges, impacting on translocal links and livelihoods of 
borderlanders (Research and Evidence Facility, 2017). Feyissa and Hoehne identify a number of variables 
that shape the livelihood opportunities of state borders and borderland which can also offer a useful 
perspective to analyse connectivity and mobility as possible solutions to PDS.12 
With regard to characteristics that influence transnational links, literature reveals that there are a number 
of differences between diasporas created by and/or related to conflict and other diasporas without such a 
background. Without referring to the large bulk of literature on the complex role of diasporas in conflict 
settings (see sub-section 3.6 below), the legal status of asylum seekers, often having temporary and limited 
rights in countries of residence, limits their ability to engage with the origin country and refugees who have 
escaped continue to fear government surveillance or repression. In addition, the experience of conflict and 
violence may have an impact on the responsibility to support those left in conflict situations and the 
formation of identity (Horst, et al., 2010). Literature suggests a high degree of fragmentation of diaspora 
                                                             
11 The other two resource clusters are political resources (such as access to alternative centres of political power, trans-border political 
mobilisation, and sanctuary for rebels wishing to alter national structures of power) and identity resources (such as legitimising one group’s 
claim for statehood or confirming the boundaries of particular ethnic groups). 
12 These variables, amongst others, include the entrepreneurial skills of borderlanders, their cultural schemes or cognitive differences, the 
degree of inter-state economic differentiation. 
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groups from the region, especially with regard to the Somali diaspora organised along regional, clan, 
socioeconomic, religious, gender, generational and political lines (Erdal & Horst, 2010). Studies on the 
Somali diaspora show that clan-belongings, or rather sub-clan divisions reflecting ancestral clan territories, 
are evident in the social transnational networks and also in return, i.e. shaping discourses on the locations 
to return to which are rather linked to their ancestral locations rather than their place of birth (Bjork, 2007). 
A study by Ambroso (2002) shows the importance of transnational clan networks for reintegration of 
repatriated and returned Somalis from Ethiopia in 1997-98 (Ambroso, 2002). 
Textbox 5: The formation of the Eritrean diaspora 
The 2014 study The Eritrean diaspora and its impact on regime stability: responses to UN sanctions 
examined how the government institutionalised feelings of belonging and creation of a national identity 
in the diaspora (Hirt, 2014). In the late 1970s the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF) created 
transnational structures by including those living in exile into its mass organisations to channel their 
participation in the war effort. The ELPF, by 1980 a transnational organisation and central political body, 
replaced the mass organisations with “apolitical” community organisations, the so-called “mahbere-
koms” and introduced a two per cent diaspora tax for all Eritreans living abroad. Many Eritreans 
volunteered to pay the tax and maintained strong links which is why the term “long-distance 
nationalism” is used instead of transnationalism in the literature. With the breakout of the war in 1998, 
the government tried to mobilise all institutional structures for fundraising and ideological support. 
However, the political landscape of the diaspora had diversified since the end of the Ethiopian-Eritrean 
war. Before the war, the diaspora had consisted mainly of government supporters while afterwards the 
Eritrean Democratic Party (EDP) was founded by disillusioned members of the People's Front for 
Democracy and Justice (PFDJ), and throughout the past decade a variety of civil society and human rights 
groups have arisen. As a reaction, the ruling elite established the Young PFDJ (YPFDJ) in 2004 as a 
meeting point for the pro-government diaspora youth. In addition, the government has tried to block all 
“hometown links” and individual support networks of the Eritrean diaspora for communities in Eritrea 
as they are being viewed as regionalist and backward. Thus, Eritreans in the diaspora can contribute to 
their relatives’ livelihoods through cash remittances, but any engagement in business opportunities is 
virtually impossible. The government’s policies have also created a cleavage between the post-
independence generations growing up in Eritrea and those born abroad as they have been successful in 
mobilising diaspora youth and taking up “their role as key transnational citizens of Eritrea seeking to 
‘defend a nation under attack’” (Hirt, 2014, p. 127). 
 
While research on communication channels and media use in the region is limited and often outdated, 
some small scale studies exist that focus on specific refugee camps. With the general trend of using mobile 
technologies to offer services and support the integration of refugees it can be expected that also research 
activities in this area will increase. Nevertheless, the potential of mobile technologies for supporting 
refugee communities is highly context and country specific, as table 4 below on the mobile network 
coverage shows.  
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Table 4: Percentage of refugees living in areas with different types of mobile cellular coverage by global 
regions and countries (2014)13 
Country Country/Region Total  
(Excluding Refugees with No Geo-
Location Data) 
No Coverage At Least 2G At Least 3G 
Eritrea 2,762 0% 100% 0% 
Ethiopia 640,337 59.8% 39.4% 0.9% 
Kenya 551,352 0% 27.9% 72.1% 
Somalia 2,088 0% 100% 0% 
South Sudan 246,657 94.0% 6% 0% 
Sudan 272,495 4.2% 72.0% 23.8% 
 
A 2011 study by Gagliardone and Stremlau follows the evolution of digital media use in region by the 
diasporas, specifically related to Eritrea, Ethiopia and Somalia. While Eritrea was the last country to connect 
with the internet in 2010, digital media consumption is very high, compared to other countries in the 
region. The Eritrean internet seems to be supportive towards the government. This is explained by the fact 
that the President’s party PFDJ has developed a large set of engagement channels with communities 
abroad (see textbox 5) to support the struggle for independence. These activities were afterwards taken 
over by Eritrean embassies. Ethiopia has a state monopoly over telecoms and in 2006 the government 
started to filter websites of (potential) opposition groups, including those of Ethiopians living abroad. 
Influential online spaces of the Ethiopian communities abroad are blocked in Ethiopia. With regard to 
Somalia, Somali-language websites, media outlets and communication companies are mainly operated by 
businesspeople in the diaspora (Gagliardone & Stremlau, 2011). Within the Sudanese diaspora, two 
websites are operated by diaspora businesspeople and IT-specialists which cover political and economic 
matters and are consumed both by diaspora communities and the population in Sudan. In addition, a 
number of whatsapp groups exist that connect diaspora communities within and outside the region and 
Sudanese staying in Sudan. These groups mainly cover daily life matters and provide support and guidance 
among members of the diaspora. While some groups are organised along the lines of the different regions 
(states) of Sudan, others are organised thematically (e.g. women groups, directions when arriving at new 
destinations). While sub-regional identity seems important for the diaspora when discussing political affairs 
it is less important for daily life matters. Generally, social media usage is very high in all countries of the 
region, and young people in particular have easy access to information, images, and advice from a wide 
range of sources (Research and Evidence Facility, 2017). 
                                                             
13 Based on (UNHCR, 2016), using data from 2014 UNHCR Statistical Yearbook; refugees without general location information are not 
included; no data was available on Djibouti.  
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Textbox 6: Use of mobile technologies in the Kakuma refugee camp 
The 2018 study Innovating mobile solutions for refugees in East Africa (Hounsell & Owuor, 2018), which 
includes the Kakuma refugee camp as one case study, identified general patterns of using mobile 
technologies and its role in supporting refugees. Over 72 per cent of refugees in Kenya have access to 
3G connectivity (and 99 per cent in the Kakuma camp own a mobile phone), with much of the rest in 
both countries covered by 2G (not providing internet access). In urban areas, refugees have the same 
opportunity as locals to access mobile-based internet services with over 90 per cent being able to access 
3G (see also (UNHCR, 2016)). Facebook, WhatsApp and Google provide the majority of communication 
platforms used by refugees and were often cited as trusted channels for communicating with friends 
and family. 
While mainly focussing on the role of mobile technologies on migration, the study also identified a 
number of factors for livelihood support. The study found that refugees primarily use the mobile internet 
(3G/4G) for accessing information and communication with friends and family, in addition to sourcing 
information from family and friends as well as social media and SMS. Interestingly, the results showed 
that smartphone ownership increases with level of education (and decrease with age), and is not 
significantly influenced by the income as the majority of refugees who own a mobile device earn less 
than 1 USD per day. 
The most pressing needs of refugees identified in the study that already are or have the potential to be 
supported by mobile technology were cash, resettlement opportunities, education/upskilling and family 
tracing/reunification. Mobile money services are a common way for refugees (and local populations) to 
exchange cash and buy goods and services, most people in Kenya would use M-Pesa, in addition to 
dedicated services developed by multinational businesses and multilateral agencies such as UNHCR or 
the World Food Programme (WFP). Through a scheme developed by WPF (called bamba chakula) 
refugees in Kakuma are able to buy items that are not provided at the camps distribution centres. With 
regard to resettlement opportunities, refugees usually have to travel to specific centres to obtain 
information on their resettlement status, although UNHCR started to offer a toll-free helpline. And while 
there are numerous apps available for refugees already resettled, none (at the time of the study) existed 
that provide to support refugees settling in Kenya with useful information. Many refugees already make 
use of mobile apps for language learning and translation. Some apps were piloted in the Kakuma camp, 
including the Enzea App that is designed to provide affordable life-long learning opportunities. With 
regard to family tracing/reunification, mobile or website-based platforms exists provided by UNICEF and 




 Generally, very few studies exist on transnational links, networks and connections of diaspora 
communities residing in the region with their origin country. More research is available covering 
the (political) engagement of diaspora communities residing in the Global North. In addition, 
studies on the Somali diaspora dominate research in that field.  
 With regard to the linkages between diaspora communities in and outside the region, studies 
suggest that on the one hand transnational links diminish the longer displaced populations are in 
exile which may negatively affect the livelihoods of those in PDS. On the other, the forms of 
support change and diaspora communities outside the region try to promote self-sufficiency 
measures and migration outside the region which may offer possibilities for getting out of PDS. 
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 With very little studies available on translocal connections, research on the resources used by 
borderland communities, which shows how mobility and connections as well as ethnic belongings 
and community-specific skills have the potential to improve the livelihood opportunities, offer 
useful insights to also analyse possible coping mechanisms of displaced communities in protracted 
situations. 
 Also research results are relatively scarce with regards to the characteristics influencing 
transnational links. Evidence suggests that there are differences between refugee and migrant 
diasporas caused by the experience of violent conflict and being a refugee shapes which shapes 
identity formation and relationships with origin countries. In addition, literature suggests a high 
degree of fragmentation of diaspora groups from the region along regional, clan, socioeconomic, 
religious, gender, generational and political lines which also shapes their transnational 
engagement as well as return considerations. 
 Some new research is available on the use communication tools and mobile technologies by 
refugee communities. It shows that they have the potential for supporting the livelihoods of 
displaced communities but also for education purposes and family-reunification, i.e. offering 
opportunities to improve the situation of populations in PDS. Nevertheless, research also shows 
that the potential is highly dependent on the countries in questions and the barriers to the use of 
mobile and other communication technologies.  
3.2 Mobility patterns 
Besides forced displacement, literature on the region also highlights the mixed nature of flows within and 
outside the Horn of Africa (IOM, 2018). While there is a focus on irregular migration, legal and particularly 
labour migration receives very little attention. Generally, migration within the region is described as being 
dynamic and highly reactive to political, socio-economic and environmental factors. Irregular channels are 
used predominately because of limited options for regular migration or the administrative challenges 
associated with it (Marchand, Reinold, & Dias e Silva, 2017). Research also describes the routes used by 
migrants leaving the region, mainly via the Northern Route (also known as the ‘Central Mediterranean 
Route’); the Eastern Route out of the East and Horn of Africa towards Yemen and onwards to Gulf countries; 
the Southern Route (through Kenya towards South Africa) connecting the East and Horn of Africa to South 
Africa as well as the Sinai Route from the East and Horn of Africa through Sudan and Egypt into Israel 
(Marchand, Reinold, & Dias e Silva, 2017). 
The most relevant destination country for labour migration seems to be Kenya, and Sudan to some extent, 
while Kenyan emigration is also dominated by labour migration, mostly towards countries outside the 
region. No bilateral labour agreements between the focus countries seem to exist but one between 
Ethiopia and Kenya allows their citizens to move between the two countries without visas (MGSoG, 2017b). 
A free movement protocol of the IGAD region is underway but has not been adopted. Studies also found 
that there is a close link between displacement and economic migration with an increasing number of 
refugees embarking on migration journeys, i.e. secondary movements, mainly to Saudi Arabia and the Gulf 
States, also see the case study on mobility patterns of Somali (UNHCR, The World Bank Group, 2015). 
IOM’s 2018 report A Region on the Move, based on migrant observations recorded in Djibouti, Ethiopia, 
and Somalia, shows that flow types within the HOA are diverse: Between January and June 2018, seasonal 
migration was the most common type of migration (22 per cent), followed by labour migration (21 per 
cent), short-term, local movement (20 per cent), movement due to natural disaster (15 per cent) and 
movement due to conflict (11 per cent) (IOM, 2018, p. 21). Migrants were predominantly male (48 per cent 
of observations), while female adults made 27 per cent of observations and children 25 per cent (IOM, 
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2018, p. 21). A study by the Research and Evidence Facility estimates that approx. 20 million of people 
across the region rely on pastoralism and an additional large part of the population relying on rain-fed 
agriculture for their livelihoods. For the first group, mobility is a fundamental livelihood practice and for 
the second seasonal labour migration is a coping strategy to mitigate shortfalls in production. When these 
livelihood systems come under pressure, people move to urban areas where they often find themselves 
trapped if they moved without the intention to benefit from the urban economy (Research and Evidence 
Facility, 2017). Generally, rural studies on the HOA region and the literature on pastoralism and how to 
improve the viability of pastoralist livelihoods could provide useful departure points for elaborating 
pathways out of protractedness and improve livelihoods.  
Over 4 million refugees and IDPs have returned to their areas of origin between 2006 and 2013 although 
it does not necessarily mean that they find durable solutions to the situation of displacement (UNHCR, The 
World Bank Group, 2015). While the phenomenon in the region is generally not well researched, some 
studies give insights in the motivations and characteristics of return processes. In Southern Sudan, there 
seems to be a strong sense of people ‘returning home,’ based on patriotic considerations of contributing 
to the building of a viable and peaceful Southern Sudan. A study on Somali returnees found that three-
quarters of returnees were living in a temporary shelter (UNHCR, The World Bank Group, 2015; Samuel 
Hall Consulting, 2014). Among the coping mechanisms deployed by returnees was secondary migration 
back to sites of displacement. 
A 2014 return intention survey (RIS) by IOM and UNHCR showed that estimated 2.6 per cent of the refugees 
living in Dadaab intended to return to Somalia within the 24 months following the RIS. The intention to 
return among those who arrived in Kenya in the earliest period (1991-2001) is considerably lower 
compared to those who arrived in the more recent time periods (2002-2007 and 2008-2013). They have 
fewer ties and knowledge about property or employment options in Somalia and had typically fled conflict, 
while those who left Somalia later mostly fled because of the drought (IOM, UNHCR, 2014, p. 9). The survey 
has also found that those who intend to return to Somalia travel back and forth four times more than those 
who have no intention to return, mainly to visit family members and relatives, with a minority checking on 
property, agriculture or business. Furthermore, not surprisingly, the share of those who intend to return 
have close contact with family and friends in Somalia, compared to those who do not intend to return. The 
RIS also recommends that durable solutions corresponding to traditional migratory patterns have a greater 
chance of sustainability, including labour mobility, temporary migration, and alternative forms of legal stay  
(IOM, UNHCR, 2014). 
Although resettlement is only an option for very few refugees, as shown in figure 5, it has important 
multiplier effects benefitting a wider group than the resettled individuals, particularly remittances from 
resettled refugees are a major component of many refugees’ livelihoods, as sub-section 3.4 shows. Lindley 
and Haslie (2011) show that a special focus was laid on the resettlement of protracted Somali refugees who 
arrived in Kenya in 1991 and 1992 (Lindley & Haslie, 2011). 
The mobility of refugees is limited by the encampment approaches in all refugee-hosting HOA countries 
with administrative barriers to movement, as shown in the case study on mobility patterns of displaced 
Somali below (see textbox 8). Still, the closed camps do not prevent people from moving but increases the 
selectivity of mobility. Livelihood constraints and security considerations, such as the fear of being 
abducted by trafficking gangs, due to the encampment policies induce onward migration. Similar to the 
strategies used by Somali refugees to enable them to move, Eritreans either bypass or leave refugee camps 
in Eastern Sudan using unofficial channels to acquire citizenship, ID cards and travel permits to exit the 
camps (Research and Evidence Facility, 2017). 
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Figure 5: Resettlement figures on Eritrean, Somali and Sudanese refugees14 
 
 
Textbox 7: Mobility patterns from Eritrea and the effects of emigration restrictions 
A report by EASO (2016), prepared before the border opening between Eritrea and Ethiopia in 2018, 
shows that emigration from Eritrea was highly restricted by the requirement to obtain official travel and 
identification documents which depends on the completion of national service. At the same time, this is 
one of the main drivers of Eritrean emigration. Hence, migration movements were largely irregular and 
border crossings largely take place at night and in rural areas away from the main roads due to risks such 
as being shot or detained by Eritrean border guards. Due to the limited options for regular emigration 
and the dangers associated with irregular emigration, human smuggling was prominent in Eritrea with 
some reports stating that Eritrean border officials are involved in smuggling activities. Regular migration 
seemed to be easier for some groups, even though the issuance of travel documents can be arbitrary. 
Those groups were men above 54, women above 47, children up to the age of 13, individuals, who are 
exempted from national service, individuals seeking health treatments abroad, former freedom fighters 
and their families, higher ranking government officials and their families, and in some cases, students, 
businessmen, sportsmen and individuals travelling to conferences abroad are also permitted to exit the 
country (MGSoG, 2017a). Also return by Eritreans is in some cases punished by Eritrean authorities, 
depending on whether they returned to Eritrea voluntarily or were forcibly returned, and what their 
national service status was prior to leaving (EASO, 2016). 
 
 
                                                             
14 Data from UNHCR’s resettlement finder, only includes the top origin countries of resettlement, (UNHCR, 2019e). 
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In June 2018, Eritrea and Ethiopia announced their agreement to end the two-decade long “state of 
war” between the two countries and resume friendly relations. While there were expectations that 
refugee flows to Ethiopia would decrease after the opening of the border, figures suggest that the 
opening had resulted in an influx of Eritreans crossing over into Ethiopia with family reunification being 
cited as one of the main reasons for the influx. In addition, no changes by the Eritrean government have 
been made to the duration of national conscription (Mixed Migration Centre, 2019). 
 
Textbox 8: Mobility patterns of Somali IDPs and refugees 
In the analysis of protracted displacement of Somalis, Hammond identified the “constant use of social 
and economic networks across great distances and international borders [as] important individual and 
collective survival strategies upon which as many as 40 per cent of the Somali population relies in one 
way or another” (Hammond, n.d., p. 15). Since 2012, many diaspora Somalis have gone back to Somalia, 
either temporarily or permanently. Nevertheless, the possible use of mobility as a resource depends on 
the financial and legal ability of the people in question: return is mostly used by those who have 
permanent residence or citizenship in another country and usually are relatively successful 
economically. They are hence able to leave Somalia again when the security situation deteriorates. For 
potential returnees from neighbouring countries who lack the legal and financial means to re-emigrate 
the situation looks different. 
Lindley and Haslie (2011) found that internally displaced use practices like informal return, de facto 
integration, and onward migration. Individuals and families also often deploy multiple, 
translocal/transnational strategies in seeking protection and livelihoods and leading to durable 
solutions, e.g. when resettled refugees send remittances to relocate internally displaced people to safer 
areas or to buy refugee relatives in the region national ID documents (see below) (Lindley & Haslie, 
2011). Relocation of IDPs is taking place spontaneously while official efforts within the Somali territories 
to return people are all forcible.  
With regard to Somali refugees, besides spontaneous returns (between 1990 and 2005, it is estimated 
that there were over 1 million returnees to Somalia from the region), return of refugees is also taking 
place forcibly, with numerous reports to confirm this practice. In addition, displaced people were 
pressured to leave through government messages, withdrawal of assistance or not given the opportunity 
to claim asylum. From the Somali side, refugees also received pressure to go back often resulting in 
dispersement into urban areas.  
Although Kenya’s encampment policy since the early 1990s restricts movements of refugees, over time, 
informal cross-border movements between Kenya and Somalia became more common, despite its high 
risks. Generally however, refugees living in Dadaab very rarely travel between Somalia and Kenya, with 
96.7 per cent of families never travelling (IOM, UNHCR, 2014, p. 11). Many refugees in Dadaab have not 
been able to leave since they arrived in the early 1990s. In order to be able to move officially, refugees 
are required to obtain movement passes issued by the Department of Refugee Affairs in Dadaab, which 
are authorised for people travelling for specific reasons. Very few passes are issued generally. Many 
attempt to leave without a pass by using bribery or informally obtaining Kenyan national ID cards which 
allows them to move around the country, access formal employment, higher education and a greater 
degree of security. A drawback for some refugees was, however, that they have been excluded from 
resettlement because of holding a Kenyan ID.  
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In Nairobi, the presence of Somali refugees seems to be generally tolerated by the authorities with less 
barriers to movement. In order to migrate out of Kenya, the issuance of Convention Travel Documents 
is needed but very few are being issued so some refugees move onwards as documented or 
undocumented migrants (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, 2016). 
While some displaced make use of mobility as a strategy towards durable solutions and improving their 
livelihoods, the ability to use such strategies is highly selective and differentiated by age, physical ability, 
gender, economic resources, and personal qualities 
Key messages 
 The opportunities for mobility as well as actual mobility patterns of refugees seem to constitute a 
determinant in shaping actual returns. Hence, short-term mobility might lead to durable return in 
the end. 
 The various forms of mobility, including labour migration, seasonal migration etc., might offer 
durable solutions to displaced populations which reflects the need to open up considerations of 
what consists a durable solution. 
 Information about labour migration in the region is scarce, but seasonal migration provides the 
basis for livelihoods for a large part of the population in HOA. In relation to the point above, rural 
studies on the HOA region, pastoralism and how to improve the viability of pastoralist livelihoods 
could provide useful departure points for elaborating pathways out of protractedness and improve 
livelihoods.  
 While some displaced make use of mobility as a strategy towards durable solutions and improving 
their livelihoods, the ability to use such strategies is highly selective and differentiated by age, 
physical ability, gender, economic resources, and personal qualities. This is aggravated by the 
encampment policies limiting the use of those strategies.   
3.3 Family dynamics 
Studies show that women and children often account for a disproportionate share of the displaced in the 
region as conflict contributes to changes in social structures that again increase their vulnerability to the 
effects of conflict and insecurity (UNHCR, The World Bank Group, 2015). Family splitting is common due to 
conflict, e.g. when men leave families to join armed groups. There are also reported cases of men being 
turned away at borders, male soldiers bringing their families to safety before returning to conflict fronts, 
and women and children crossing the border at their own. As an IRC report shows, women and children 
account for over 90 per cent of South Sudanese refugees in Gambella, Ethiopia (IRC, 2014, p. 24). A UNDP 
study suggests that 70–80 per cent of IDPs and refugees are women and children (UNDP, 2014, p. 4). Also 
Hammond states that there are there are slightly more female Somali refugees in the camps in Kenya than 
men and that more than half of the refugees living in the camps in Kenya are under 18 years of age with 
approx. 10,000 refugees are reportedly “third generation” (Hammond, n.d., p. 9). 
At the same time, the separation of families constitutes a livelihood strategy to spread economic risks. 
Grayson (2017) describes that families split up between the camp and the cities with wives and children 
staying in the camps to have access to affordable living and education, whilst breadwinners, mostly men, 
work in the cities and send money back (Grayson, 2017). Female-headed households are common among 
refugees and IDPs: A UNICEF report shows that 50–60 per cent of IDP households in Somalia are female-
headed (UNICEF, 2011), similar to the situation of South Sudanese refugees (textbox 11). Reports also show 
a high share of unaccompanied children (IOM, 2018). An increasing number of unaccompanied children 
are leaving Eritrea as many are seeking to avoid national conscription (MGSoG, 2017a).  
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With regard to transnational family support, some studies, mainly on Somalia diaspora communities, show 
the importance for supporting the livelihoods of those family members or relatives staying in the region. 
Nevertheless, an article by Cindy Horst (2007) shows that diaspora members are concerned about the 
endurance of financial support from those residing outside the region as their children’s ties with those in 
the region become less strong. In order to mitigate the risk of reduced transnational support, parents in 
the diaspora teach their children on these social practices, i.e. how to remit money (Hammond, Awad, 
Dagane, Hansen, & Horst, 2011; Horst, 2007). 
The complex role of family size in shaping resilience and vulnerabilities is not yet well understood: Some 
studies make a correlation between household size and increased livelihood opportunities which result in 
higher resilience; others state that wealthier families host extended family members with fewer financial 
resources, thus resulting in the greater number of children being made up of nieces and nephews. The 
question is hence whether family size actually is the dependent variable (Research and Evidence Facility, 
2017). A recent ODI study refers to qualitative studies on interactions between refugee and host 
populations, also with regard to inter-marriage, e.g. between Turkana women from Kenya marrying male 
refugees and other host and refugee communities in Dadaab (O’Callaghan & Sturge, 2018). 
The separation of families as well as conflict-specific risks for men often result in changing gender roles: In 
order to access basic resources such as firewood, water, etc., women and children travel long distances in- 
and outside camps as men face greater risks of death if they leave those sites, which again exposes them 
to risks of sexual or physical assaults (UNHCR, The World Bank Group, 2015). In addition, livelihood 
programmes targeting women can (unintendedly) reinforce gender stereotypes and prevent women from 
fully participating in the labour market if they are not based on solid sectoral analysis (Research and 
Evidence Facility, 2017). While this was the result of an analysis of a UNDP livelihood training programme 
for Eritrean female ex-combatants, these lessons learnt might provide entry points for researching the 
impact of livelihood opportunity programmes on gender roles among displaced populations. 
Textbox 9: Somalia – changing gender roles through conflict and displacement 
The 2016 paper The impact of war on Somali men and its effects on the family, women and children gives 
insights in the changes of masculinities and women’s roles among Somali refugees since the collapse of 
the state and the years of conflict and displacement. Male vulnerabilities result especially from the fact 
that male refugees are far from their clan territories and support of their group members. In addition, 
the ones most vulnerable to displacement are from marginalised groups. The paper shows that camp 
management policies often overlook male vulnerabilities and create “feelings of virtual emasculation”, 
especially because dependency on aid from humanitarian actors “undermines men’s responsibility as 
decision-makers and providers for the family” and little recognition for men, e.g. when housing is 
registered in the name of the wife rather than both husband and wife. 
The absence of men, either physically or with regard to their responsibilities for the household, resulted 
in women taking up male responsibilities, including earning the family income. Many older men who 
have been in high-status jobs before depend on women when no job equivalent with their former status 
is available. While this has brought women into new jobs and more public roles than before (Research 
and Evidence Facility, 2017), decision-making outside the family is still dominated by men and women 
are mostly left out of formal political representation. Nevertheless, there is also some evidence of 
women being present in the public sphere and their significant roles in peacebuilding and state-building 
negotiations (Gardner & El-Bushra, 2016). 
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Textbox 10: Experiences of young Somali refugees in the Kakuma Refugee Camp 
The ethnographic study Children of the Camp. The Lives of Somali Youth Raised in Kakuma Refugee Camp 
(2017) by Grayson examines the experience of young Somalis between sixteen and 26 who have spent 
most or their entire lives in Kenyan camps and ended up in the Kakuma camps. The study shows that 
youth does not question being in a camp during the time of education and schooling but dissatisfaction 
with the camp as a restricted space grows when they should establish themselves as adults. 
Reconsidering the past, youth consider that their lives in Somalia would have been wasted and that the 
camp have significantly improved their lives. In their imagination of the future are different as the 
difficulties and limited possibilities of the camp because of the unsettledness in Kenya and their fear of 
and not knowing Somalia.  
Resettlement was central in the young people’s experience and imagination, besides coping strategies 
such as education, further migration and transnational networks. It creates an intense restlessness and 
provides an imagined or real way out. The camp is considered as part of a broader trajectory and 
perceived as a constrained space with youth feeling that creating their own future is partially beyond 
their reach. Among those who know that they will not be resettled, some lost hope for a decent exit 
from the camp, others do not assimilate with that information and again others take responsibility for 
their live in their own hands (Grayson, 2017). 
 
Textbox 11: Transformed gender relations among South Sudanese refugees in the Kakuma camp 
Grabska’s (2014) study Gender, Home & Identity: Nuer Repatriation to Southern Sudan describes the 
experience of young South Sudanese who have returned to their communities of origin in South Sudan 
and how their identities and gender roles were transformed by their life in the refugee camps. The study 
shows that women coming from privileged social groups were more likely to be displaced to Kenya and 
Ethiopia while those with a lower status were displaced within Sudan, mostly around Khartoum. Those 
displaced across the border had access to (limited) education which increased their social position vis-
à-vis men and women who stayed behind. The ones around Khartoum were also confronted with Islamic 
norms and codes which shaped gender relations of the mostly Christian Nuer in a more conservative 
way.  
With regard to changing gender relations and roles, the study illustrates how the perception of “being 
modern” of the South Sudanese refugees changed during their experience in the refugee camps. For the 
youth this meant going to school, engage in the community, church and to learn about women and 
children rights which altered their status in the community. “Because of the UN, school and church, Nuer 
in Kakuma became different. We are somehow ‘modern’ like you, civilised and pro-women.” (Quote 
from a Nuer boy, in (Grabska, 2014, p. 65)) For girls and women, the camp offered the possibility of 
education, despite the fact that only 11 per cent of those attending secondary school were female. In 
addition, the camp’s programmes on women rights and gender equality created images of gendered 
modernity. To some extent men took over domestic tasks due to a lack of female relatives, and this 
behaviour was respected by other refugee men, but this often changed after return under the influence 
of local masculinity ideas. In that sense, Kakuma represented an extra-territorial space where some 
gender and social relations could be transformed. Nevertheless, this does not only open new possibilities 
for girls and women, it also resulted in a more articulated gender ideology of girls’ subordination and 
power asymmetries.  
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Grabska states that “encounter between the ‘localised and de-territorialised refugee’ and global UN 
humanitarianism which, combined with diasporic connections created through resettlement 
programmes, has opened new possibilities for change, so-called development, progress and 
empowerment” (Grabska, 2014, p. 66). 
Key messages 
 Studies show that women and children often account for a disproportionate share of the displaced 
in the region. 
 Some studies exist on the changed gender roles either due to the absence or changed 
responsibilities of men because of the dependencies created in refugee camps as well as on the 
split families. While there is no research on the link to protractedness, research shows the 
enhanced access to livelihood opportunities through these strategies.  
 A still under-researched phenomenon with regard to PDS is the experiences of young people who 
were born in the camps and stayed their entire life there.  
 With regard to transnational family support structures, studies show that financial support from 
those residing outside the region become less strong as their children’s’ ties with those in the 
region diminish with the long duration of refugees staying in exile.  
 Relatively few studies exist on the integration of refugees in the host communities and families 
through inter-marriages between people from the host and refugee communities which provides 
a solution to PDS for those individuals.  
 And lastly, research showed that ill-planned livelihood programmes for refugee women can 
reinforce gender stereotypes and provide barriers for women accessing the labour market.  
 
3.4 Economic linkages and flows 
Refugees themselves use a range of economic coping strategies with remittances being the most well 
researched part of it. Remittances to the region are significant but vary considerably according to the 
respective country, as figure 6 below shows (no data is available for Eritrea, Somalia and South Sudan). 
Figure 6: Remittance inflow to the Horn of Africa15 
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While remittances to Kenya, Ethiopia and Djibouti have generally increased over the past years, the trend 
looks different for Sudan which used to receive large amounts of remittances, but the inflows have 
drastically decreased. No data however exist on internal remittance flows despite its importance (ACP 
Observatory on Migration, 2011). 
Studies show that remittances are also being received in the camps. According to a 2011 study by United 
States Bureau for Populations, Refugees and Migration (PRM) more than one-third (37 per cent) of refugees 
in the Dadaab camp said that they received remittance support. In contrast, a 2016 Refugee Household 
Vulnerability Study on the Kakuma camp found that only 6 per cent of households stated that they received 
remittances (Guyatt, 2016, p. 17). The camp Ali Addeh in Djibouti is described as a rest home for those 
unable to migrate and work sustained by remittances of those working in the urban centres and the Gulf 
(UNHCR, The World Bank Group, 2015). A 2013 study on Somali Refugees Living in Kenyan and Ethiopian 
Camps found that less than a fifth of households interviewed said they were receiving remittances, either 
in form of cash or, to a lesser extent, food. Remittances were received on a monthly basis by relatives in 
the US or Kenya, other Western countries and, with regard to a few instances, Somalia (Durable Solutions, 
2013). The study also showed that a greater number of refugees in camps in Kenya receive remittances 
than in Ethiopia, which is explained by the duration of exile as refugees who have been living in the camp 
for longer appeared more likely to receive remittances (Durable Solutions, 2013). Hammond refers to an 
unpublished report that partially explains the difference by the lack of a telecommunications network (and 
hence the ability to receive mobile transactions) in the camps in Ethiopia which has been cited by refugees 
as a severe impediment to their livelihoods (Hammond, n.d.). 
Few studies on the role of remittances for IDP exist. Bryld et al 2014 underlines the coping mechanisms 
within Somali society, the tradition of clan support and diaspora remittances. They found that most 
households cumulate various livelihood strategies, with 11 per cent stating that remittances are one source 
of the family income. Overall, remittances are identified as an important factor to strengthen resilience 
and reduce vulnerabilities of IDPs, particularly in camps (Bryld, Kamau, & Sinigallia, 2014). 
The 2016 Household Vulnerability study on Kakuma found important differences in livelihoods according 
to the refugees’ countries of origin: While remittances is particularly common for Somalis it is less the case 
for Ethiopians, Sudanese and South Sudanese. Ethiopians and Somalis seem to engage more in business 
activities than Sudanese and South Sudanese while reselling the ration was the most common source of 
income for South Sudanese (Guyatt, 2016). Furthermore, also the duration of stay in the camps seem to 
have a significant impact.16 With regard to employment with NGOs, important differences exist by 
nationality based on language skills but these are levelling out with longer durations of stay.  
Regarding the use of remittances, a study on livelihoods in the Kakuma camp shows that about a fifth 
started their businesses with remittances with large variations by sub-camps (Guyatt, 2016). An impact 
evaluation on food assistance shows that remittances-receiving families had a significantly better level of 
food security with again large differences according to nationality/ethnicity (TANGO International, 2011).17 
According to Lindley (2007), the role of remittances in recipients’ livelihoods, in this case Somali refugees 
in Eastleigh/Nairobi, varies considerably: for some remittances regularly cover living expenses, others 
receive them occasionally in times of particular need, e.g. when other livelihood strategies collapse, serious 
health or other issues, and again others receive remittances to fund livelihood-related projects, such as 
                                                             
16 According to Guyatt (2016), only 2.4 per cent of those that arrived in the last two years reported cash income from employment compared 
to 10 per cent of those arriving before 2014; similarly, 2.4 per cent of new arrivals reported a cash income from business compared to 8.3 
per cent of earlier arrivals. 
17 TANGO International (2011) shows that 1/3 of Tigrigna refugees (from Eritrea) receive remittances and another 1/3 receive other types 
of financial support, while substantially fewer Somali households receive remittances. 
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businesses, mostly coming from more than one “investor” (Lindley, 2007). Remittances also facilitate 
regional mobility, e.g. supporting those who want to leave Somalia or the camps in Kenya to move to 
Nairobi, and outward mobility towards “the West”.  
 
Textbox 12: Impact of remittances on livelihoods of remitters and recipients 
Grayson in her study Children of the Camp. The Lives of Somali Youth Raised in Kakuma Refugee Camp 
(2017) shows that many of those who receive regular and sufficient remittances have settled outside 
camps and return temporarily when a new registration takes place, so that they do not lose their ration 
card and resettlement perspectives, or if they run out of money (Grayson, 2017). She also describes that 
expectations of those still in the camp vis-à-vis (resettled) refugees outside the region are high and 
sometimes impeding refugees outside the region to pursue education or training opportunities in order 
to continue working and send remittances. The study found that all refugees outside the region 
interviewed were sending remittances. Other studies focussing on remitters show that people struggle 
to meet the demands of their relatives which results e.g. in cutting their basic spending, incur debts, 
take on more than one job (Hammond, 2011; Lindley, 2007). Remittances to the camps and countries of 
origin are also coming from refugees residing in cities, as Lindley (2007) shows. 
 
Displaced people’s livelihoods are integrated to a large degree in the economies of asylum countries, as 
especially studies on Somali refugees in Nairobi, the Kakuma camp and the Dadaab camps show. Grabska 
(2014) describes how refugees residing in Nairobi and other cities in Kenya regularly travel to the Kakuma 
refugee camp to receive food ratios and carrying them back to the cities. In addition, Kenyan Turkana 
communities, who used to live among the refugees in the camp until the early 2000s, were engaged in 
economic communities such as selling water, firewood and alcohol as well as serving as servants in refugee 
households and offering sexual services. Kakuma is also described as a market with business and trading 
opportunities attracting Kenyans from other parts of the country (Grabska, 2014). This is confirmed by 
Enghoff et al. (2010), demonstrating that the Dadaab refugee camps have become the main markets for 
the host community to sell products, mainly from pastoral production (Enghoff, et al., 2010). UNHCR/World 
Bank describe Dadaab as a de facto “free trade zone connecting tax-free contraband from Dubai through 
Kismayo to Dadaab and surrounding points” (UNHCR, The World Bank Group, 2015, p. 30). A recent study 
by Samuel Hall Consulting on Dadaab shows that market exchanges between refugees and host 
communities are common  and that Dadaab community members have managed to establish livelihood 
opportunities in a diversity of sub-sectors (Samuel Hall Consulting, 2019). Enghoff et al. (2010) also show 
that commodity prices in the Dadaab area were significantly lower than in other dryland towns due to the 
re-sale of World Food Programme (WFP) rations, access to food by locals registered as refugees and 
imports via Somalia.18 However, one has to treat these findings with caution as findings may differ 
according to differences in the ratio of in-kind food and restricted cash-based transfers within the food 
assistance provided. It would be interesting to analyse the economic impacts for example of the Kalobeyei 
settlement established by UNHCR and the County Government of Turkana in 2016 as an “integrated 
settlement” where WFP provides 93 per cent of the food assistance in form of cash based transfers (World 
Food Programme, 2015, p. 13).  
                                                             
18 According to a WFP monitoring report cited in Enghoff et al. (2010), 18 per cent of the cereals are typically sold to obtain more preferred 
commodities. Enghoff et al. (2010) estimate that at least 50 per cent of the household community benefit from cheap food sales and that 
average prices are about 20 per cent lower than comparable locations elsewhere in Kenya. 
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Camps also offer some limited employment opportunities for refugees, e.g. working for UNHCR and NGOs 
in addition to incentive-based employment programmes for a small salary or against receiving soap, tea, 
shoes, etc. Despite their limitations, South Sudanese Nuer refugees describe the income-generating 
activities and access to services in camps still better than in their locations of origin. For the South Sudanese 
Nuer refugees life in camps has changed their livelihoods from cattle-keeping to paid employment and 
relying on financial aid and remittances (Grabska, 2014). For Kenya, Guyatt (2016) showed that 
encampment significantly transforms livelihoods, e.g. while agriculture or pastoralism has been a major 
livelihood of households before displacement, it may be restricted in camps due to the scarcity of natural 
resources, availability of land etc. Business may become a new livelihood despite it was not the preferred 
previous source of income. Jobs are also created because of trade: In Dadaab refugees as well as members 
of the host community run shops. In 2010, there were 5000 shops counted in the Dadaab camps, which 
corresponds to the figure of shops in major cities with annual turnovers larger in the camps than in the 
same type of establishment in Dadaab town. Reports also show that local construction companies employ 
registered refugees, including from outside the camps  (Enghoff, et al., 2010). Samuel Hall Consulting (2019) 
demonstrates that some refugees in the Dadaab camps are informally employed by host community 
members to look after their livestock, as restrictions on mobility severely limit refugees’ ability to 
effectively run their own businesses in cost effective ways. A 2011 impact evaluation on the Dollo Ado 
camp in Ethiopia shows that the main income-generating opportunity for refugees was work as day 
labourers with few refugees owning businesses or engaging in petty trade (Ruaudel & Susanna, 2017). 
According to Guyatt the three main sources of income for households in the Kakuma camp were 
remittances, regular employment and running a business (Guyatt, 2016). 
Textbox 13: Livelihood strategies of female IDPs in Darfur 
A study on IDPs in Darfur, based on research in the five IDP camps outside the town of Zalingei (West 
Darfur) and on mixed IDPs and residents in the town of Kebkabiya in North Darfur, demonstrated the 
changes of livelihood strategies of IDPs after five years of displacement to urban areas, which reflects a 
shift from former rural-based farming systems to their new environments and demographic changes, 
particularly the increased proportion of women (Young & Jacobsen, 2013). The conflict and crisis in 
Darfur have had a profound impact on mobility, restricting physical movement of people and livestock, 
which led to a virtual collapse of livelihood systems, including access to natural resources and constraints 
on the remittances of migrant workers’, production and market failures. 
Income from the sale of livestock and agricultural products became almost non-existent within camps, 
despite this being the main livelihood option before displacement. Livelihood strategies shifted towards 
casual labour, seasonal employment, relying on remittances, small business ownership, selling aid and 
other petty trade. A key factor in determining livelihood opportunities is whether IDPs are confined to 
camps, as in Zalingei, or whether they live in town and are more integrated with the local population, as 
in Kebkabiya. In Kebkabiya, 43 per cent of the respondents engaged in casual daily labour, while only 3 
per cent did so in the Zalingei camps. In urban areas, IDPs have switched to a mix of urban and seasonal 
rural strategies, supplemented where possible by labour migration. 
Women shouldered a three-fold burden in the camps with a) having greater responsibilities because 
male family members have often migrated, either for work or to join militias; b) being tasked with finding 
new livelihoods in employment-scarce locations; and c) many of their livelihood strategies, including 
firewood collection, grazing livestock, have increased protection risk due to raiding. According to the 
study, prospects for large-scale return to rural locations of origin are very unlikely. IDPs will rather 
continue to pursue urbanised livelihoods as they perceived advantages of urban living. 




 The literature demonstrates the degree to which displaced people’s livelihoods are integrated in 
the economies of asylum countries. Most studies, however, focus on Somalis, either in Nairobi, 
the Dadaab or Kakuma, with some also covering camps in Ethiopia. 
 With formal economic opportunities being limited, many camp refugees engage in transnational 
livelihood systems, such as informal trade in goods and services. 
 Studies show that remittances are received in the camps, although the extent varies according to 
the respective study. Very few studies look at the role of remittances or other transnational 
support for IDPs.  
 The use of economic transnational strategies highly depends on differences by location (impacted 
by the access to mobile networks, climate etc.), nationality of the displaced and duration of 
displacement. 
 Literature stresses (but not discussed in the section as such) that without the secure right to land, 
employment and property, refugees and returnees (as communities as such) will struggle to 
maintain a livelihood (Crisp, 2003). 
 Studies also show that also broader transnational economic linkages engendered by PDS exist that 
benefit the host communities. 
 Displaced populations tend to change their livelihoods compared to before displacement which 
also impacts on possible livelihoods after return.  
 
3.5 “Social remittances”: circulation of ideas and social practices 
Literature on social remittances to the Horn of Africa, referred to as ideas, behaviours, identities and social 
capital flowing from receiving to sending-country communities, is scarce, with the exception of “political 
remittances”, discussed in the section below.  
Grabska (2014) shows how the experience in the Kakuma camp as well as access to global communication, 
technology and through contacts with resettled communities in Europe, the US and Australia has changed 
the way of doing things among the South Sudanese Nuer communities. This concerns for example the use 
of modern technologies as well as Western clothing. 
Hansen (2004) demonstrates that returnees to Somaliland have been important with regard to transferring 
ideas and knowledge from the “West” and raising issues relating to human rights, minority rights, good 
governance, the environment and the position and role of women in the society (Hansen, 2014). Hammond 
et al. (2011) emphasises how return visits to Somaliland made some diaspora individuals to realise that not 
only sending food and money would make a difference but also engaging with the local community to 
initiate mentality changes, i.e. showing how to collect funds, engage professionals, help concretely rather 
than waiting for assistance from abroad. Social remittances are also transferred through programmes such 
as Transfer of knowledge through expatriates’ nationals (TOKTEN), a UNDP initiative implemented by IOM, 
or through other forms of consultancies. Shandy (2016) found that Somalis who returned temporarily for 
those kind of consultancies or knowledge transfer activities would also like to do this kind of work in camps 
and work on a camp-based project, although it has not yet materialised (Shandy & Das, 2016). 
Although not directly linked with social remittances in a narrow sense, so-called community based 
organisations established by refugees play an important role in equipping other refugees with “life skills” 
and better employment opportunities. Some of the organisations also receive external funding, sometimes 
from diasporas outside the region or external actors (UNHCR, 2012). Betts et al. (2018) demonstrates that 
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refugees in Nairobi often benefit from vocational and entrepreneurial educational support provided by 
refugee-led CBOs, including language training and business development counselling. Others benefit from 
apprenticeships and ‘on-the-job-training’ within small refugee-led businesses (Betts, Omata, & Sterck, 
2018). 
Textbox 14: Awareness-raising and trainings on conflict resolution in the Tigray region 
Zewde et al. (2010) in their study on Contribution of the Ethiopian Diaspora to Peace-Building:  A Case 
Study of the Tigrai Development Association (TDA) also analysed awareness-raising and sensitisation on 
issues related to peace (Zewde, Yntiso, & Berhanu, 2010). TDA established what it called Conflict 
Resolution Project (lasting from 2002 to 2005) with the objective of healing trauma, mitigating 
psychosocial stress, enhancing people's conflict resolution skills, and creating mutual trust among the 
peoples living along the border. 
TDA’s support activities included awareness raising workshops, training on conflict resolution and 
psychological counselling, TV and radio programs on conflict-related issues, establishment of a resource 
centre, facilitation of conflict resolution activities by releasing grants, distribution of leaflets and posters, 
and conducting harmonisation activities between the Eritrean refugees and the local people in the 
border areas. Trainings were provided to community leaders, religious leaders, leaders of women and 
youth organisations, and other influential personalities in their respective communities and providing 
psycho-social assistance. The activities also targeted internally displaced persons and their 




 Literature on social remittances to the Horn of Africa mainly focusses on the so-called political 
remittances, discussed in the section below.  
 Disregarding political remittances and involvement in political affairs, some studies show the 
importance of returnees, also through institutionalised knowledge transfer programmes, for 
transferring ideas and knowledge and raising issues relating to human rights, minority rights, good 
governance, the environment and the position and role of women in the society. 
 Refugee-led community-based organisations play an important role in supporting other refugees 
in building their skills through educational and business-related programmes. 
 
3.6 Transnational political relations 
All countries in the region have large diaspora communities abroad. The stock of emigrants can, however, 
only give a very general indication. Their transnational political relations are subject of a number of studies, 
particularly on the Somali and Ethiopian and also the Eritrean and Sudanese diaspora.  
Table 5: Stock of emigrants, 201719 
Djibouti 122,221 Eritrea 11,848 Ethiopia 1,155,390 
Kenya 297,292 Somalia 478,294 Sudan 1,402,896 
                                                             
19 (UN, Population Division, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 2017); no data on South Sudan exists.  
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Research gives some insights about the engagement of diasporas in political affairs back home. Relatively 
well researched is the financial and other diaspora support to local administrations at municipal and 
regional level in Somalia, also with regard to underwriting peace talks. Hammond et al. (2011) demonstrate 
that support is much greater for the local than the national level. At central government level, in 2011, half 
of the new government’s 26 cabinet members were returning diaspora members. Some research also exist 
on diaspora’s role in funding conflict in Somalia, particularly al-Shabaab, although there are some reports 
indicating a drastic decrease of diaspora contributions to al Shabaab, because of fear of counter-terrorism 
laws and because al-Shabaab’s reputation has suffered (Hammond, Awad, Dagane, Hansen, & Horst, 2011). 
Barnes (2018) also demonstrate that South Sudanese diaspora members, particularly those with dual 
nationals, being part of political and military elite and/or the diaspora chapters of the Sudan People’s 
Liberation Movement, returned to fill government positions, in addition to financially supporting people 
involved in the country’s multiple political spheres, such as civil servants, members of parliament, 
politicians, civil society and media (Barnes, et al., 2018). 
Textbox 15: Diaspora support for peace conferences and mediation efforts of inter-clan and intra-clan 
conflicts in Puntland and Galmudug 
Hammond et al. (2011) demonstrates the diaspora contributions to conflict resolution in Puntland and 
Galmudug (an autonomous region in central Somalia). The diasporas were major stakeholders in peace 
negotiations and provided funds for holding peace conferences and mediation efforts of inter-clan and 
intra-clan conflicts in both Puntland and Galmudug, resulting in a number of peace agreements between 
subclans and intra-clans. They participated in negotiations to set guidelines to enforce the peace 
agreements and, as one result, diya payments (compensation money for killings) have been raised to 
extremely high levels which made it more difficult for clan members, even with diaspora support, to pay 
diya, with the ultimate aim of reducing the incidence of killings and revenge killings (Hammond, Awad, 
Dagane, Hansen, & Horst, 2011).  
 
With regard to the role of diasporas in conflict resolution, Hammond et al. (2011) shows that the number 
of local NGOs in Somalia receiving support from private investors or individuals in the diaspora was the 
highest in South/Central Somalia (32 per cent) with the South being area mostly affected by conflict 
(Hammond, Awad, Dagane, Hansen, & Horst, 2011, p. 32). Diaspora’s engagement in conflict resolution 
and peace building in Somaliland started with the Somali National Movement created in the diaspora and 
its initial resistance to the Siad Barre regime. Diaspora support also included supporting the Somali National 
Movement in eastern Ethiopia financially and in-kind and lobbying western governments to end their 
support to the Barre regime. Afterwards, the western diaspora mostly focused on contributing to post-war 
reconstruction and rehabilitation. In Puntland, the diaspora is politically engaged in Parliament (to a lower 
extent than in Somaliland as traditional clan leaders appoint Members of Parliament), by taking up 
positions as ministers or in state bureaucracy, by advocating for the state in the diaspora and mediation of 
conflicts (Hammond, Awad, Dagane, Hansen, & Horst, 2011). Hoehne et al. (2010) identified three main 
areas in which diaspora engagement has contributed to peacebuilding in Ethiopian, Somali, and Eritrean 
diasporas, namely through enhancing the space for greater contestation of ideas and, as a result 
broadening the range of political options for communities in the countries, through remittances as a 
stabilising factor and through direct and indirect diaspora peace initiatives, such as conflict mediation and 
spreading hope through rebuilding the educational sector (Hoehne, Feyissa, Abdile, & Schmitz-Pranghe, 
2010). Warnecke (2010) demonstrate that Ethiopian and Somali diaspora organisations in Germany and 
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the Netherlands, because of restricted engagement opportunities20, only engage indirectly in activities 
related to democratisation, human rights and peacebuilding, and rather focus on less contested issues 
related to development, reconstruction and humanitarian aid (Warnecke, 2010). The non-politicised focus 
might also be a result of the widespread concern among external actors, such as development agencies, to 
collaborate with diaspora organisations from conflict-driven countries because of their political 
entanglement and high level of fragmentation (Sinatti, et al., 2010). Generally, one can say that it is difficult 
to draw a line between development, conflict resolution and humanitarian aid, as Zewde (2010) with 
regard to the activities of the Tigrai Development Association, Schmitz-Pranghe (2010) with regard to the 
role of the Eritrean diaspora before and after the struggle for independence, Hoehne (2010) and Linden et 
al. (2013) with regard to diaspora contributions to reconstructing the educational sector in Somalia and 
South Sudan respectively show (Zewde, Yntiso, & Berhanu, 2010; Schmitz-Pranghe, 2010; Hoehne M. , 
2010; van der Linden, Blaak, & Aate Andrew, 2013). 
Textbox 16: Role of the Eritrean diaspora in conflict and re-construction 
Schmitz-Pranghe (2010) on the Modes and Potential of Diaspora Engagement in Eritrea emphasises the 
crucial role of the Eritrean diaspora during the struggle for independence and after the conflict. During 
the struggle for independence, Eritrean diaspora members played a significant role by supporting the 
liberation movements financially. She also showed that that the government in place, its policies as well 
as the overall political, social and economic conditions in the country of origin impact to a large extent 
on whether diaspora members are willing and able to engage transnationally in the political sphere. 
After the conflict, large parts of the diaspora participated in the referendum of independence and the 
following debate of the draft constitution and continued to contribute to the (re-) construction process 
by regular contributions, donations, the purchase of Eritrea bonds, etc. Especially in the context of the 
Ethiopian-Eritrean war, large parts of the diaspora were re-mobilised to substantially support the 
Eritrean state, both financially and through lobbying activities. 
Despite the contributions by the diaspora financially during the post-independence phase, the diaspora 
was hardly involved in the political and state-building process, due to the authoritarian regime and its 
restricted room for political participation, and returnees have mostly been excluded from government 
or administrative structures. In addition, the political climate led to withdrawal of large parts of the 
diaspora communities from political engagement and de-incentivising diaspora members to return or 
engage in skills transfers.  
 
More specifically on the role of diasporas in aid, reconstruction and development, Hammond et al. (2011) 
shows that local NGOs are the main recipients of donations for relief and development from the Somali 
diaspora. Over 1/3 of local NGOs included in the survey reported that they have connections to diaspora 
organisations and diaspora representation in the boards of Directors is very high (up to 82 per cent in 
South/Central Somalia) (Hammond, Awad, Dagane, Hansen, & Horst, 2011, p. 67f.). Besides donating cash 
or sending goods on an adhoc basis, many local NGOs have been started or managed by those returning 
from North America and Europe.  
Although few studies analyse diasporas’ engagement to address the needs of displaced populations in 
protracted refugee situations, literature on the role of diaspora in development and humanitarian aid 
                                                             
20 The Civil Society Law in Ethiopia which prohibits foreign NGOs, including those founded by the diaspora or with diaspora support, from 
engaging in core issues such as human rights, conflict settlement and reconciliation, citizenship and community development, and justice 
and law enforcement services in Ethiopia, (Nimo-Ilhan, Frankenhaeuser, Noack, & Schlaeger, 2012) 
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reveals that activities usually include a focus on displaced (mostly internally displaced) populations within 
the target group of vulnerable members of population. Hammond et al. (2011) demonstrates that in 
South/Central Somalia, private businesspeople and other diaspora representatives have been heavily 
involved in providing humanitarian support to displaced populations and others in need, after international 
humanitarian organisations have suspended their operations due to insecurity. Generally, most of the 
engagements of diaspora individuals and organisations focus on education and healthcare. 
Textbox 17: Possible avenues of support of Somali diaspora groups to Somali refugees 
The 2016 paper Diaspora Engagement and the Global initiative on Somali Refugees – Emerging 
Possibilities reviews current and possible future Somali diaspora engagement in East Africa and how this 
intersects with refugee needs (Shandy & Das, 2016). It is based on roundtables and focus groups with 
130 Somali diaspora community members in select sites in Europe and North America. Findings reveal 
that all Somalis who took part in the focus group discussions are “engaged” in assisting those in the 
region largely through financial remittances and in some cases through diaspora philanthropy, including 
to those living in refugee camps. Among these funds sent to camp, some were also intended to be used 
to support return to Somalia. However, the findings also show that focus group participants had a 
preference to send money to Somalia directly rather than to Somalis in the region, including camps, as 
there firstly, is an interest to invest in Somalia, secondly, it is less expensive to support people in Somalia 
rather than in Kenya for example and thirdly, the camps of refugees in camps are perceived as being 
met by the international community already. Supporting refugees in camps was viewed positively if the 
support is also geared towards Somalia more generally, i.e. if support initiatives are aligned with 
(sectoral) needs in Somalia, for example through tailored vocational training. Generally, the diaspora 
individuals showed an interest to transfer their knowledge in educational, health and technology issues, 
contrary to investments in the physical infrastructure of camps.  
The degree to which countries of origin have frameworks for diaspora engagement in place varies 
considerably: 
 The Djiboutian government has only recently started some efforts to institutionalise its 
engagement with the diaspora through the development of a diaspora engagement strategy and 
a diaspora mapping exercise (IOM, 2018). In addition, the Djibouti’s Accelerated Development and 
Employment Promotion Strategy (SCAPE) 2015-2019 mentions diaspora’s contribution to 
Djibouti's development and poverty reduction (Djibouti, 2015). 
 The Eritrean government has a long history of engaging with its diaspora, also see textbox 16 
above. This includes targeted outreach of representations and embassies in principal residence 
countries, information channels, shaping associations and diaspora networks, the ‘diaspora tax’, 
incentives for the diaspora to remit and invest in Eritrea and government bonds (Schmitz-Pranghe, 
2010). 
 The Ethiopian government actively tries to engage the diaspora politically, economically and in 
terms of identity and has adopted a diaspora policy in 2013. Examples are the diaspora identity 
card (“yellow card”), information provision, diaspora bonds, facilitation of remittances and 
investments, support in the case of temporary and permanent return (Marchand, Reinold, & Dias 
e Silva, 2017; Schlenzka, 2009; Kuschminder & Siegel, 2011). 
 The Kenyan government also has a diaspora policy in place since 2014 which aims at 
mainstreaming Kenyan diaspora into national development processes and to set up a National 
Diaspora Council (Republic of Kenya, 2014). 
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 With regard to Somalia, there are very limited government-led diaspora engagement activities in 
place. A series of initiatives by international organisations, private persons and diaspora 
organisations are, however, being implemented (see below). 
 No structured partnership between the government of South Sudan with the diaspora exists, 
despite some anecdotal evidence on government-diaspora exchanges (Marchand, Reinold, & Dias 
e Silva, 2017; Vettori, n.d.). 
 The Sudanese government also does not have a dedicated diaspora policy in place but mentions 
the wellbeing of Sudanese citizens in the diaspora as one of the key responsibilities of the Foreign 
Ministry Departments (Embassy of the Republic of Sudan, Washington D.C., n.d.). 
Key messages 
 Transnational political relations of diasporas from the region are subject of a number of studies, 
particularly with regard to the Somali and Ethiopian, and to some extent to the Eritrean and 
Sudanese, diaspora. 
 Engagement of diasporas in political affairs back home takes place through financial and other 
support to local administrations at municipal and regional level, financially supporting people 
involved in the country’s multiple political spheres, such as civil servants, members of parliament, 
politicians, civil society and media and through returning diaspora members taking up political 
positions at central, regional and local government level.  
 Few studies also underline the role of diasporas in the region in funding conflict. 
 Diasporas play a significant role in conflict resolution, e.g. through supporting local NGOs in 
conflict-driven areas, lobbying Western governments to end  their support to autocratic regimes, 
funding resistance movements, conflict mediation or indirectly by broadening the public discourse.  
 Indirectly, diasporas contribute to peace-building through educational projects which restore 
hopes for the future and generally it is difficult to draw a line between development, conflict 
resolution and humanitarian aid. 
 The degree to which countries of origin have frameworks for diaspora engagement in place varies 
considerably with Kenya, Eritrea and Ethiopia having institutionalised relations, Djibouti recently 
started engaging its diaspora and with Somalia, South Sudan and Sudan having no governmental 
frameworks in place. 
 Literature on the role of diaspora in development, reconstruction and humanitarian aid reveals 
that activities usually include a focus on displaced (mostly internally displaced) populations within 
their target group of vulnerable members of population. 
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4 Key policy shifts and innovations in responding to PDS 
4.1 Description of policy responses and major policy shifts and innovations in 
responding to PDS 
In the Horn of Africa (HOA), a number of policy approaches have emerged to respond to displacement in 
the short-term and protracted displacement in the longer-term. While this overview cannot be exhaustive, 
it aims to identify some general trends. When following the emergence of policy approaches and policy 
shifts to protracted displacement in the region, one can note that more attention by UNHCR, national 
governments and other actors was gradually paid to long-lasting displacement situations pending durable 
solutions (Milner & Loescher, 2011). 
All HOA countries have generally followed encampment policies with refugees being contained in camps 
with long-term care and maintenance since the 1970s/1980s. Also with regard to responding to the 
prolonged presence of refugees the trend has been to contain displaced populations in isolated refugee 
camps (Samuel Hall Consulting, 2014). The majority of them are located in rural border areas. Due to 
encampment policies, countries have put in place administrative barriers to restrict mobility. Certain 
groups were generally excluded from mobility restrictions and/or eligible for permits to access camps. 
These groups include South Sudanese refugees in Sudan or Eritrean refugees in Ethiopia due to the Out-of-
Camp scheme established by the government (Samuel Hall Consulting, 2014). In Kenya, movement passes 
are issued to those having a “valid reason to travel outside a designated area” in Kenya but the overall 
number of passes issued is low and no policy or legal guidance exist regarding their issuance (Republic of 
Kenya, 2012). In practice, they have been issued to attend schools, travel for medical reasons or, to a lower 
extent, for business reasons (NRC, IHRC, 2018). In line with encampment and the care-and-maintenance-
approach, employment opportunities have generally been restricted and limited to so-called incentive-
based employment with NGOs or UNHCR, informal day labour or running businesses.  
With the realisation of the long-lasting presence of refugees, humanitarian and development actors have 
started to develop area-based integrated approaches and planning, that aim to address the needs of 
refugees, IDPs, and host communities in common programmes. Examples are the Eastern Sudan Peace 
Agreement (ESPA) and the accompanying programme “Sustainable Options for Livelihood Security in 
Eastern Sudan (SOLSES)” which provide the overall policy framework for the promotion of recovery and 
development in East Sudan and embed the scope for addressing the needs of IDPs as part of the local 
recovery and development planning. The Transitional Solutions Initiative (TSI), implemented during 2012–
14 by development and humanitarian agencies, introduced an area-based approach, which attempted to 
integrate refugees, IDPs, and host communities into common programme planning platforms (UNHCR, The 
World Bank Group, 2015). The Somali compact also recognises the necessity of addressing the 
development needs of the displaced Somali population (Somalia, 2013). A practical example of an 
integrated approach is the Kalobeyei settlement which was conceived in 2015 as a joint initiative of UNHCR 
and Turkana County Government (Kenya). The initiative, named Kalobeyei Integrated Socio-Economic 
Development Programme (KISEDP) (UNHCR, 2018d), aims to benefit the refugee population in the 
Kalobeyei settlement and Kakuma camps and the host population in Turkana West through strengthened 
national service delivery systems, increased socio-economic opportunities and investments in building 
people’s skills and capabilities. With regard to local integration of IDPs, the Sudanese government 
announced in February 2018, after numerous attempts to close IDP camps because of security 
considerations, that it plans to turn some IDP camps in Darfur into permanent settlements, giving IDPs the 
option of a residential plot or returning to their homes. Lessons on the implementation of these plans and 
potential impacts are not yet available (IDMC, 2018). 
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With the partial shift towards integrated approaches, stronger focus was also laid on the self-reliance of 
refugees as well as a partial shift away from the encampment model. In Kenya, the WFP enhanced the 
proportion of Cash Based Transfers instead of in-kind food ratios within the Bamba Chakula programme.21 
In the Kalobeyei settlement, the WFP introduced kitchen gardens and its retail engagement initiative aims 
to create sustainable markets where refugees and host communities can access affordable food sold in 
local markets (World Food Programme, 2018). Ethiopia and Djibouti also moved away from the 
encampment model and started “whole of society approaches” in different sectors, such as health and 
education. UNHCR also reports that Kenya is in the process of including refugees in their national health 
system (Executive Committee of the High Commissioner’s Programme, 2019). The government of Ethiopia 
has adopted a national compact focused on job creation for refugees and Ethiopians, with ‘special 
economic zones’ (SEZs), i.e. industrial zones, as one central element. Djibouti’s refugee law, adopted in 
January 2017, provides access to education, livelihoods, legal support and the national justice system for 
refugees and Ethiopia’s 2019 Refugee Proclamation aims to grant refugees the right to work, access to 
education and enables freedom of movement (Federal democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 2019; République 
de Djibouti, 2017; République de Djibouti, 2017). Efforts have also been made to make refugees in South 
Sudan self-sufficient with limited success because of land ownership as a major issue (MGSoG, 2017e). Four 
HOA countries, namely Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya and Somalia have committed to implement the 
Comprehensive Refugee Response Frameworks.22 UNHCR reports that current efforts aim to explore how 
regional frameworks may complement national laws in offering pathways to long-term legal status that 
offers protection safeguards (Executive Committee of the High Commissioner’s Programme, 2019). 
Besides the rather recent focus on self-reliance of refugees, be it as part of a strategy for local integration 
or during the period pending a long-term solution, return and repatriation seems to remain the preferred 
long-term solution for refugees in the region. Several attempts have been made to facilitate return and 
repatriation as a solution to protracted displacement. To facilitate voluntary returns, the HOA 
governments have concluded a number of tripartite agreements or memoranda of understanding.  
 In November 2013, Kenya, Somalia and UNHCR concluded the Tripartite Agreement “Governing 
the Voluntary Repatriation of Somali Refugees Living in Kenya”. To support its implementation, a 
pilot project to support the return process was developed to provide refugees with cash grants, 
core relief items to support their journey home as well as reintegration assistance (UNHCR, 2015). 
Between December 2014 and the end of June 2018, 83,669 Somalis have been returned from 
Kenya under this agreement (UNHCR, 2018f, p. 2). The project RE-INTEG (Enhancing Somalia’s 
responsiveness to the management and reintegration of mixed migration flows), funded through 
the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Stability and Addressing the Root Causes of irregular Migration 
and Displaced Persons in Africa, was adopted in 2016 aims to support the sustainable and durable 
reintegration of returned refugees and IDPs in Somalia, and to anchor populations within Somalia 
(European Commission, n.d.). 
 UNHCR has signed a memorandum of understanding with the Eritrean government after its 
independence and is since then involved in the voluntary repatriation of Eritrean refugees to 
Eritrea (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, 1994). In 2000, UNHCR today began a 
repatriation programme for an estimated 90,000 Eritrean refugees who were displaced to Sudan 
(UNHCR, 2000a). 
 After the collapse of the military regime of Mengistu in Ethiopia in 1991, the Ethiopian government 
undertook a number of initiatives to create conducive return conditions for refugees, including the 
                                                             
21 Electronic cash transfer which can only be redeemed for food, introduced by WPF in the Kakuma Refugee Camp.  
22 CRRFs aim at ease pressures on the host countries involved, enhance refugee self-reliance, expand access to third-country solutions; and 
support conditions in countries of origin for return in safety and dignity. 
TRAFIG Internal Report: “Protracted Displacement in the Horn of Africa” February 2020  
40 
 
“proclamation of the right and freedom of every Ethiopian national to return to Ethiopia without 
fear of prosecution on account of having been a refugee” and concluding tripartite voluntary 
repatriation agreements with UNHCR and countries of asylum in 1991, 1993 and 1994 (UNHCR, 
1999). With the conflict between Eritrea and Ethiopia, Ethiopian nationals had to return. Reports 
show that approximately 95,000 Ethiopian nationals that were living in Eritrea returned to Ethiopia 
between May 1998 and August 2001. 
 In order to facilitate the voluntary repatriation of refugees, the Sudanese government and UNHCR 
signed tripartite agreements with Kenya, Ethiopia, Central African Republic and DRC in 2006.   
 With regard to South Sudan, the signature of the “Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the 
Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS)” on 11 September 2018 contains provisions 
upholding the right of return and prioritising reintegration of refugees and IDPs. UNHCR is not 
engaged in the facilitation of returns due to current security considerations (UNHCR, 2019c). There 
are reports about returns of IDPs and of over 142,000 South Sudanese refugees with 85 per cent 
reported to be unable to access places of origin (UNHCR, 2019b). 
Besides voluntary repatriation agreements and flanking measures, Kenya has followed the strategy to 
create a buffer zone within Somalia, referred to as Jubaland, which was already tried out in the early 1990s 
when the Moi regime in Kenya threatened to forcibly return Somali refugees (Kamau & Fox, 2013). The 
government also pressured UNHCR with its Cross-Border, Cross-Mandate Operations (CBO) to create a 
“safe haven” in Southern Somalia, which collapsed with the failure of the humanitarian intervention in 
Somalia in 1993. The Kenyan government has been militarily engaged on the Somali border and has helped 
to train the troops of the Transitional federal government of Somalia23 that were recruited from among 
the refugees. The military intervention has been partially successful in parts of Southern Somalia, and 
nearly 10,000 acres in Jubaland has been set aside for resettlement (Jamestown Foundation, 2016; Long, 
2011). The initiative found political support also from IGAD and Ethiopia which intended to create a similar 
buffer zone in Southern Somalia.  
Resettlement from the region has been ongoing over decades with most information being available with 
regard to Somali refugees which began in 1990 (Centres for Disease Control and Prevention, 2018; 
Hammond, 2014).24 Reports show that Eritrean refugees have been resettled as of 2003 from Sudan and 
Ethiopia (UNHCR, 2004) and with regard to South Sudan, UNHCR notes that few opportunities are offered 
to South Sudanese refugees beyond the region, including resettlement (UNHCR, 2019d). The EU’s 
resettlement scheme should, amongst others, focus on resettlements from Ethiopia and Sudan. 
Resettlement out of the CRRF countries and the Central Mediterranean Response are two key priority 
situations for UNHCR resettlement globally. According to UNHCR, a new Core Group for Enhanced 
Resettlement and Complementary Pathways along the Central Mediterranean Route was established in 
August 2017, which includes Djibouti, Ethiopia and Kenya (UNHCR, 2018g). Recent annual data from 2018 
showed that approximately 12 per cent of the refugees submitted for resettlement from Africa originate 
from Eritrea, 10 per cent from Somalia, 6 per cent from Sudan (UNHCR, 2018h, p. 19). Five origin countries 
in the region are in the top ten countries with regard to projected resettlement needs: South Sudan 
(158,474), Eritrea (83,520), Sudan (77,623), Somalia (65,665) and Ethiopia (19,195) (UNHCR, 2018h, p. 60). 
                                                             
23 Transitional Federal Government was the internationally recognised government of the Republic of Somalia until 20 August 2012.  
24 According to Hammond (2014), between 1995 and 2010, 55,422 Somali refugees were resettled from the region from all camps, except 
Dolo Ado in Ethiopia. The US has been the largest recipient of resettled Somali refugees. 
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Table 6: National policies and mechanisms with regard to IDPs and refugees 
 National refugee 
policy 
National body/coordination 
with regard to refugees 
National IDP policy National 
coordination with 
regard to IDPs 
Djibouti  (1997 Ordi-
nance n°77-
053/PR/AE) 
 2017 National 
Refugee Law 
 National CRRF 
action plan / 
roadmap 
 Office National pour 
l’Assistance aux Réfugiés et 
Sinistrés (ONARS) 
 CRRF Steering Committee led 
by the Ministry of Interior 
  
Eritrea   Eritrean Relief and Refugee 
Commission (ERREC), to be 
verified 
  






 Administration for Refugee & 
Returnee Affairs (ARRA) 
 Cooperation with UNHCR in 
managing camps and 
registrations  
 CRRF governance structure: 
Steering Committee chaired 
by the Office of the Prime 
Minister, co-chaired by ARRA, 
the Ministry of Finance and 
Economic Cooperation and 
UNHCR; Ethiopia CRRF 





 National policy 
and strategy on 
disaster risk 
management 
refers to IDPs 









Kenya  2006 Refugees 
Act, revised in 
2016 
 2009 Refugees 
Regulations 
 Refugee Affairs Secretariat 
(RAS) in charge of refugee 
management 
 UNHCR still has control over 
refugee status determination 
and camp management 
 Not adopted: 
2012  National 
Policy on IDPs 
endorsed by 
cabinet but not 
adopted  




was presented to 
the Parliament in 







the Ministry of 
Justice and 
Constitutional 











   
South 
Sudan 
 2012 Refugee 
Act 
   
Sudan   Sudanese Commission for 
Refugees (COR) 
 National Policy 
for IDPs, 2009 
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With the CRRF also other complementary pathways in the region are on the agenda without any 
information whether they have been tested (UNHCR, 2018h). 
In addressing protracted displacement, the range of actors involved has gradually expanded. All countries 
in the region, except Sudan and Eritrea on which no information was available, have legal frameworks with 
regard to the protection of refugees in place as well as central governmental bodies, except with regard to 
Somalia and South Sudan. The majority of national laws have only been adopted after refugee situations 
have existed for more than a decade. UNHCR is involved in all countries to a different extent, also 
depending on whether relevant legislation is existing and national responsibilities are defined. In Kenya for 
example, the government allowed for UNHCR assistance to respond to the mass arrivals of Somalis in 1991 
which resulted in the opening of seven camps. Although UNHCR still has control over refugee status 
determination and camp management in the country, it has, at the same time, little ability to influence 
policies at central government level (Miller, 2018). The Ethiopian government cooperates with UNHCR in 
managing the camps and UNHCR also keeps the database of individual refugees, due to “operational 
capacity constraints” (Agency for Refugee and Returnees Affairs, n.d.). With regard to responding to long-
lasting internal displacement, a national IDP policy only seems to exist in Sudan while cabinet has approved 
a national IDP policy in Kenya, developed in response to the humanitarian crisis triggered by the post-
election violence of 2007 and 2008, but has not been adopted.  
Several multi-stakeholder initiatives, going beyond humanitarian and emergency relief actors, have been 
formed. Examples are the inter-agency platforms for coordination and fund-raising set up by UNHCR and 
host governments, the refugee coordination model, the “Increasing Economic Opportunities for Ethiopians 
and Refugees Multi-Donor Trust Fund” (DFID, 2019; European Commission, 2018)25, or the Durable 
Solutions Initiatives (DSI) for Somalia which involves humanitarian and development partners (UN, IASC 
Clusters, NGOs, international financial institutions, regional bodies, diaspora, private sector, etc.) under 
the leadership of the respective government. With regard to linking development and humanitarian 
approaches, UNHCR has for example strengthened its cooperation with the World Bank through the World 
Bank’s International Development Association refugee and local community sub-window (IDA 18). The 
facility is specifically targeting countries with PDS and from the HOA region, Djibouti and Ethiopia are 
eligible for funding (International Development Association, 2018). Generally, there is also 
acknowledgement to bring in the private sector to find solutions to protracted displacement. The Ethiopian 
Jobs Compact aims to support Ethiopia’s industrialisation efforts through, inter alia, improvements in the 
investment climate and investment promotion. With the launch of a recent study, the International Finance 
Corporation and UNHCR aim to raise awareness and gauge interest across key private sector areas on the 
Kakuma camp as a market opportunity and start a dialogue on how the private sector actors can contribute 
to finding solutions (International Finance Corporation, 2018). At regional level, IGAD countries adopted 
the “Nairobi Declaration on Durable Solutions for Somali Refugees and Reintegration of Returnees in 
Somalia” in 2017 together with a plan of action (IGAD, 2017). Also in 2017, ministers in charge of education 
in the IGAD Member States concluded the Djibouti Declaration in which they agree to integrate refugees 
in national education policies and ensure refugees, returnees, and host community members have access 
to quality education without discrimination (IGAD, 2017). In March 2019, an IGAD Thematic Meeting on 
Jobs, Livelihoods, and Self-reliance of Refugees, Returnees, and Host Communities took place in Kampala 
(IGAD, 2019). 
                                                             
25 Referred to as the Ethiopian Jobs Compact which includes the World Bank, DFID, the Netherlands, the European Investment Bank and the 
EU. 
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4.2 Case studies of key policy shifts 
4.2.1 Kenya: Encampment and return as a prioritised durable solution  
Kenya has hosted some of the highest numbers of refugees in recent decades. A large number of the 
refugees are from Somalia. Currently there are 280,000 registered Somali refugees in Kenya (UNHCR, 
2018e)26 (the peak was in 2011 with more than 500,000 officially registered refugees) but estimates go up 
to 450,000, consisting of both recent and influxes dating back to the 1980s and the civil war in that time 
(Miller, 2018, p. 79). Somali refugees are mostly in the Dadaab camps, Nairobi and some are also in the 
Kakuma camps. In this section, reference is mainly made to the presence of Somali refugees in Kenya as 
they are mostly referred to in the Kenyan security discourse with regard to refugees. 
Before 1990, the Kenyan government applied a “laissez-faire” and open-door policy, allowed refugees to 
settle freely in towns throughout the countries and secure their own means of livelihood. Assistance to 
the, primarily urban, refugees was provided by church-based associations that organised themselves 
through the Joint Refugee Service of Kenya (JRSK) since the last 1970ies in addition to secular NGOs. After 
the split of JRSK in 1983 response mechanisms were disintegrated and accused of its inefficiency. The NGOs 
financed their refugee assistance through funding from UNHCR and other international agencies. The NCCK 
emerged as the main actor and primary partner of UNHCR. It focussed on self-reliance of refugees through 
entrepreneurial and other self-help schemes and urban community programmes. The Kenyan Red Cross 
Society managed a transit camp in Thika on behalf of the Kenyan government. Towards the late 1980s, an 
approach emerged that settled refugees in rural camps as an alternative model to urban settlements, 
nevertheless still focussing on self-reliance. Urban scattered settlements complicated the process of 
estimating the resources needed for assisting refugees. In addition, the Kenyan government perceived the 
country as a transit rather than destination country (Kagwanja, 2002). 
With beginning of the 1990s, the influx of large numbers of refugees from Somalia triggered a shift in 
discourse and practice. Refugees were accused of escalating crime and insecurity, particularly in urban 
areas, and harming Kenya’s tourist industry. In addition, they were considered a burden as not perceived 
as being equipped with skills to offer, contrary to the ones arrived in the late 1980s, primarily from Uganda 
(Kagwanja, 2002). In 1992, the Moi regime threatened to forcibly send back Somali refugees and in 1993, 
UNHCR was asked to repatriate all refugees from Somalia, Ethiopia and Sudan. At the beginning, UNHCR 
mainly focussed on the Cross-Border, Cross-Mandate Operations (CBO) that aimed to create a safe haven 
in Southern Somalia, stabilise populations, stem refugee flows and incentivise refugees to return home. 
With the failure of the humanitarian intervention in Somalia, also the security framework for the CBO 
collapsed in 1993. Due to international pressure and suspense of external aid, the government suspended 
its threat to expel refugees that were not repatriated but instead imposed that refugees can only reside in 
camps located in Northern Kenya, i.e. in the Dadaab camps and the Kakuma camp (Kagwanja, 2002; Lindley 
& Haslie, 2011). Refugees were viewed as being the responsibility of UNHCR and partner NGOs while the 
local administration was there to ensure the security of the Kenyan citizens. UNHCR was negotiating land 
deals with the local population without government involvement and established a separate security 
machinery. 
Also in the 1990s, the outbreak of ethnic violence resulting from the polarisation of national politics along 
ethnic lines in the process of Kenya’s return to a multi-party system and long-standing inter-ethnic 
competition for diminishing land resources shattered Kenya’s image as a peaceful and stable country. The 
government was involved to a greater extent in the IDP emergency, but also dealt with it from a security 
                                                             
26 UNHCR data on refugees (incl. refugee-like situations) from 2017. 
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rather than a humanitarian standpoint. To gain control, the Moi regime introduced “Security Operation 
Zones” and prevented NGOs, International Organisations, human right groups and the media from granting 
access to the IDP sides. End of 1994, displaced in the Maela camp were forcibly returned to their locations 
of origin and the camp was destroyed by government security forces (Kagwanja, 2002). 
In the 1990s and first half of the 2000s, Kenya was still relatively open to refugees and offering asylum to 
large numbers. In addition, the government moved towards more collaborative interventions in the North 
Eastern Province (NEP)27, where Dadaab is located, focussing on access to justice, reduce conflicts with 
refugees and introduce projects to improve the situation of the host community; resulting in a sharp 
decline in violent crime (Lindley & Haslie, 2011). In the second half of 2000 the government got more 
involved in refugee issues and the Refugees Act, which was stalled by the first Somali refugee crisis in the 
early 1990s, was passed in 2006 and accompanying Refugee Regulations entered into force in 2009. The 
legislation put the government in charge of “governing refugees” and camp management. At that time, 
with concerns about Al Shabaab and their efforts to recruit followers in Kenya, the Somali presence became 
securitised (again). Other contributing factors was the wider discourse about Muslim minorities and 
extremism in Kenya, the “war against terror” after the attacks of September 11 in 2001, incidents of social 
unrest in Nairobi and the World Cup bombing by Al Shabaab in neighbouring Uganda. This resulted in 
officially closing the border with Somalia in 2007 and remilitarisation of the NEP and police raids on urban 
areas to locate Shabaab followers (Lindley & Haslie, 2011). In addition, also the general relations of the 
central government with NEP contributed to the trend of securitisation of refugees in general and Somali 
refugees in particular, as there were a number of attempts at secession into the Somali state and military 
responses by the government. Furthermore, also the fact that Kenya was seen as a strategic partner for 
“the West” in fighting terrorism contributed to donors not pushing for other responses to displacement 
than encampment and repatriation (Miller, 2018). 
With another large influx of refugees in 2011 and 2012, the securitisation trend increased. In October 2011, 
the government suspended the registration of refugees claiming that the camps were too full and that 
accommodating more refugees would be a threat to national security (Teff & Yarnell, 2012). In December 
2012, following a series of security incidents in Nairobi, the government issued a Directive outlining an 
encampment policy which was subsequently ruled unconstitutional by the High Court. After serious 
security incidents, including the Westgate Mall attack in September 2013, the government launched in 
April 2014 a security operation, called “Usalama Watch” targeting persons, the majority of them ethnic 
Somalis, who may pose a security or terrorist threat (KNCHR, 2014; UNHCR, 2014). In December 2014, the 
Parliament passed the Security Amendment Act, limiting the number of refugees and asylum seekers in 
Kenya to 150,000 which was suspended in parts by the High Court, including the provision that limits the 
number of refugees. In April 2015, following the attack at Garissa University, the Deputy President of Kenya 
announced that the Dadaab refugee camps should be closed within three months and that 350,000 Somali 
refugees will be returned to Somalia. After a meeting between UNHCR and the government, it was agreed 
that the camp would not be closed within three months but that the repatriation programme of the Somali 
refugees would be enhanced to include new areas that are considered safe (UNHCR, The World Bank 
Group, 2015; RMMS, 2017; Mutambo, 2015). 
In order to promote repatriation, UNHCR, pressured by the government, was engaged in establishing a 
“preventive zone” along the Kenyan and southern Somali border which has not been successful. The 
initiative got more political support by government actors aiming to establish a buffer zone to prevent 
arrivals of refugees and facilitate repatriation. These hopes of the government seem to fuel the cautious 
approach of the government to invest into camps or opening new ones (Lindley & Haslie, 2011). At the 
                                                             
27 The central government has had a tense relationship with NEP since colonialism. 
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same time, there have been a number of reports of forced or pressured returns, also indirectly through 
withdrawing assistance or warnings that that the Kenyan Government would take “stern action” against 
any people who host refugees escaping the camps (Thomson Reuters Foundation, 2016). In addition, the 
recurring threats of the government to close the Dadaab camps due to security reasons also push refugees 
to return, e.g. in 2016 (a year later, the high court in Kenya ruled that a closure would violate the country's 
constitution) (Anker, 2018) and again in February 2019 within a six-month period and asking UNHCR to 
accelerate repatriations and the relocation (Mixed Migration Centre, 2019). 
Return and encampment are still the dominating response to protracted displacement in Kenya, although 
some small steps have been made to promote the self-reliance of refugees: In 2017, Kenya became part of 
the CRRF and parliament approved a bill creating a more conducive environment for refugees to work and 
travel which, however, was not agreed to by the President. In addition, some efforts have been made, such 
as the integrated settlement Kalobeyei and its “Integrated Socio-Economic Development Program”.  
4.2.2 Ethiopia: Phasing out encampment and facilitating access to work 
Similar to Kenya, Ethiopia is one of the biggest refugee hosting countries in the world. The number of 
registered refugees is 892,000 from 30 origin countries (UNHCR, 2018e).28 The majority are from the three 
neighbouring countries Eritrea, Somalia and South Sudan. Similar to the Kenyan context, some have been 
there since the early 1990s, while others recent arrivals. Due to the onset of the conflict in South Sudan in 
December 2013 South Sudan has been the main country of origin for newly arriving refugees (with an influx 
of close to 200,000 South Sudanese refugees in 2014 alone) (MGSoG, 2017b, p. 4). In addition, UNHCR 
figures estimate over one million IDPs in Ethiopia. The majority of refugees in Ethiopia are located in Tigray 
Regional State and the four Emerging Regions of Ethiopia: Afar Regional State; Benishangul-Gumuz, 
Regional State; Gambella Regional State; and the Somali Regional State. The Emerging Regions are 
considered as the least developed regions in the country, characterised by harsh weather conditions, poor 
infrastructure, low administrative capacity, a high level of poverty and poor development indicators 
(UNHCR, 2018b). 
Ethiopia has been following strict encampment policies and refugees are mostly accommodated in 26 
camps which are under protection of the police. Some exemptions have been made for those with serious 
protection concerns, for health and humanitarian reasons (UNHCR, 2017; MGSoG, 2017b). Refugees are 
restricted in accessing work, education and freedom of movement as Ethiopia maintains reservations to 
the 1951 Refugee Convention with regard to the right to engage in wage earning employment (Article 17) 
and the right to access elementary education (Article 22) (Anonymous, 2015). Security considerations are 
an important aspect with regard to encampment as the main response to displacement. This concerns 
tensions in the border regions with South Sudan and security challenges concerning Al-Shabab 
(Anonymous, 2015). Also protection is framed by Ethiopian authorities by security considerations, i.e. the 
security of the refugees and the security around the refugee camps, explaining policy activities in the camps 
to ensure that armed people are not entering or exiting the camps or use camps as a resting place 
(Tesfaghiorghis, 2018). At the same time, Ethiopia has not made official statements declaring its objective 
to repatriate its refugee. 
Since 2010, a number of steps have been undertaken, moving away from strict encampment and the care 
and maintenance model. In 2010, the government introduced the “Out of Camp Policy” (which is a 
government scheme and not a policy in the strict sense) allowing Eritrean refugees to live in urban centres, 
provided they had necessary means to financially support themselves. Eritrean refugees are also allowed 
                                                             
28 UNHCR 2017 data, includes refugees (incl. refugee-like situations) and asylum seekers.  
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to access higher education, through an agreement with the Ethiopian Administration for Refugees and 
Returnee Affairs (ARRA) (Samuel Hall Consulting, 2014). 
Few studies are available that give indications about the impact of the OCP: Some state figures that by 
2014, about 2400-4000 Eritreans lived outside the camps, mainly in Addis Ababa (Asabu, 2018, p. 69; 
Samuel Hall Consulting, 2014, p. 17). Samuel Hall Consulting (2014) concluded that by that time the OCP 
offered the opportunity to live outside the camp to approximately 3.7 per cent of the Eritrean caseload 
living in Ethiopia. This number has grown rapidly: according to UNHCR, more than 8,000 Eritrean refugees 
lived in Addis Adaba under the OCP in 2015 (USCRI, 2016). Another study states that since 2016 close to 
15.000 refugees have registered under this scheme (Tesfaghiorghis, 2018, p. 61). The main criterion (and 
obstacle) regulating the access to the scheme is whether the refugee can benefit from the guarantee of a 
sponsor, having Ethiopian citizenship, who takes on responsibility for his or her living expenses once 
outside the camp. The main reasons for the scheme only benefitting Eritreans put forward by Ethiopian 
authorities are the strong cultural links and homogeneity across the border between Eritrea and Ethiopia 
which makes relationships with the host community easier, the already existing networks that Eritrean 
refugees can rely on in the cities and the potential security risks that could come with opening the scheme 
to other caseloads. In addition to having a sponsor as a main obstacle for not applying for the scheme is 
that refugees do not want to lose their chance to resettle, besides a lack of livelihood opportunities (Samuel 
Hall Consulting, 2014).  
In addition to the OCP, a small number of refugees of all nationalities are authorised to stay in the cities for 
security, medical or humanitarian reasons (12,500 according to 2016 data). Serious medical cases are 
referred to the urban programme when the person requires treatment that is beyond the capacities of the 
health centres run by ARRA in the camps. Unlike the OCP beneficiaries, urban refugees are supported by 
the UNHCR and receive a subsistence allowance, have access to basic health services and education but 
are not authorised to work (Mallett, et al., 2017; Samuel Hall Consulting, 2014). 
Ethiopia’s commitment to protect refugees and find ways to strengthen self-reliance of refugees were 
strengthened when the prime minister made nine pledges at the Summit on Refugees and Migrants hosted 
by the United Nations General Assembly in September 2016. These pledges will be implemented through 
the Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework (CRRF) which was born out of the New York Declaration 
for Refugees and Migrants, adopted in New York in September 2016. The nine pledges are i) to expand the 
“out-of-camp” policy to benefit 10 per cent of the current total refugee population; ii) to provide work 
permits to refugees and those with permanent residence ID; iii) to provide work permits to refugees in the 
areas permitted for foreign workers; iv) to increase enrolment of refugee children in preschool, primary, 
secondary and tertiary education, without discrimination and within available resources; v) to make 10,000 
hectares of irrigable land available, to enable 20,000 refugees and host community households (100,000 
people) to grow crops; vi) to allow local integration for refugees who have lived in Ethiopia for over 20 
years; vii) to work with international partners to build industrial parks to employ up to 100,000 individuals, 
with 30 per cent of the jobs reserved for refugees; viii) to expand and enhance basic and essential social 
services for refugees; and xi) to provide other benefits, such as issuance of birth certificates to refugee 
children born in Ethiopia, and the possibility of opening bank accounts and obtaining driving licenses 
(Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 2017). 
In February 2017, Ethiopia became one of the few countries to pilot the CRRF. The CRRF Road Map for the 
implementation of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia Government Pledges and the practical 
application of the CRRF states that “Ethiopia’s policies are based on three key principles: to maintain its 
longstanding history of hospitality in hosting refugee, to meet its international obligations as a signatory to 
both the UN and OAU refugee conventions and to materialize its foreign policy goal of building sustainable 
TRAFIG Internal Report: “Protracted Displacement in the Horn of Africa” February 2020  
47 
 
peace with all of its neighbours through strengthening people to people relations” (Federal Democratic 
Republic of Ethiopia, 2017, p. 3). The roadmap, and the subsequent National Comprehensive Refugee 
Response Strategy, aims to ensure refugees become self-reliant through their socio-economic integration 
in the country. Gradually phasing out the camp-based assistance model is also part of the strategy (UNHCR, 
n.d.). 
It is still premature to assess the impact of the policy shift but a few changes have already been made: The 
2004 Refugee Proclamation has been revised and a new refugee law was adopted in parliament in 17 
January 2019. The law makes specific reference to local integration of protracted refugees: “’Local 
Integration’ means a process by which individual groups of refugees who have lived in Ethiopia for a 
protracted period are provided, upon their request, with permanent residence permit to facilitate their 
broader integration with Ethiopian nationals until they fully attain durable solutions to their problem” 
(Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 2019). The new law grants every refugee and asylum seeker the 
same access to pre-primary and primary education as Ethiopian nationals. They also have the right to 
engage in wage earning employment in the “same circumstance as the most favourable treatment 
accorded to foreign nationals pursuant to relevant laws”. With regard to rural and urban projects 
specifically designed by the Ethiopian government and the international community to benefit Ethiopian 
nationals and refugees, refugees shall be given equal treatment as Ethiopian nationals in the same projects. 
The law also enshrines freedom of movement and residence within Ethiopia as well as accessing driver’s 
licences. In addition, the law also provides for the right of refugees to be issued with identity papers 
(Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 2019). With regard to identity papers, a proclamation permitting 
civil documentation for refugees was passed in July 2017 and first birth certificates for refugees have been 
issued at civil registration offices, established in each of the 26 refugee camps (Federal Democratic Republic 
of Ethiopia, 2012; UNHCR, n.d.). A number of mechanisms have been established to increase partners’ 
coordination and collaboration between ministries in the refugee response. Progress was made towards 
the inclusion of refugees in national systems in the area of health, education (e.g. adoption of the national 
curriculum in all schools operating in refugee camps). An additional initiative is Ethiopia’s Job Compact, a 
USD 500 million programme which combines grants (from DFID, the Netherlands and the EU) and finance 
from the European Investment Bank in concert with the World Bank. It was already agreed before the CRRF 
and includes a series of industrial parks with an anticipated 100,000 jobs projected, 30 per cent of which 
will be for refugees as per the terms of the financing (UNHCR, 2018g). 
While there is little analysis available on the reasons for the Ethiopian government to phase out its policy 
of encampment and facilitating local integration, Tesfaghiorghis (2018) lists a number of factors. On the 
one hand, the promotion of an open door policy and promoting self-reliance promotes building a better 
image of Ethiopia, an authoritarian state, towards the international community. In that line of 
argumentation, the onward movement of mainly Eritrean and Somali refugees out of Ethiopia and the 
response from Europe in regards to that has also changed the incentives around refugee. Furthermore, 
Ethiopia also is in need to find ways to fund its development agenda for its own population (Tesfaghiorghis, 
2018).  




UNHCR lists seven protracted refugee situations in the Horn of Africa, originating from Eritrea, Somalia, 
South Sudan and Sudan. All countries in the region, with the exception of Djibouti, are also affected by 
mass internal displacement and protracted IDP situations, although data on IDPs is generally less robust. 
The protracted refugee situations last between 32 and (up to date) seven years. However, these situations 
of protractedness should not be viewed as static, as a number of analysed cases in the framework of this 
study show. On the one hand, when looking at the seven protracted refugee situations and protracted 
internal displacement situations, protracted and new displacement situations exist simultaneously. On the 
other, while a situation may be classified as protracted, such as displaced populations in the Dadaab 
refugee camps in Kenya which was opened in 1991, not all of its residents are in protracted displacement 
in the narrow sense. While they are ‘living in limbo’ from a legal perspective, such as not being able to 
legally reside in Nairobi because of Kenya’s encampment policy, they are not necessarily ‘in limbo’ from an 
economic perspective and are able to sustain themselves and their relatives. In addition, affected 
populations also perceive protracted displacement situations differently according to respective stages in 
their ‘life cycle’: as a study on young Somali refugees in Kakuma camp, with many of them born in the 
camp, emphasises, refugees did not view themselves as being ‘stuck’ as long as they had the potential to 
develop and unfold their potential, e.g. through access to education in the camps. This perception changed 
once they became young adults with the wish to find a way to sustain themselves and their future families.  
The notion of protracted displacement does also not cater to the fact that many displaced people are 
engaged in seeking solutions for themselves, their families and communities. The various forms of mobility, 
internally and across borders, offer solutions for displaced populations in order to enhance access to 
financial capital, education and to split economic risks. In that sense, resettlement has a wider effect than 
only benefitting those resettled individuals and families, as resettled communities support those staying in 
the region. At the same time, studies also showed the unintended effects of resettlement and 
transnational/translocal support networks as they can undermine people’s agencies and create 
dependencies instead of supporting people’ search of strategies to sustain themselves. Most importantly, 
transnational/translocal families contribute to securing the lives and livelihoods of those family members 
who ‘stayed behind’ or who are stuck in a protracted situation. At the same time, transnational/translocal 
livelihood strategies during situations of protracted displacement have the potential to alter gender roles, 
i.e. with men taking over care roles and women engaged in wage employment. In addition, situations of 
protracted displacement change the livelihood strategies of displaced people, either through “training 
programmes” or the absence of traditional livelihood strategies such as farming. These might undermine 
the prospects for moving out of situations of dependencies on external aid once a durable solution has 
been found.  
Despite encampment as the dominating response to PDS in the region, displaced people’s livelihoods are 
integrated in the economies of asylum countries. With formal economic opportunities being limited, many 
camp refugees engage in transnational and translocal livelihood systems, such as informal trade in goods 
and services and small businesses. The extent to which displaced populations receive remittances varies 
according to location, e.g. whether residing in a camp or urban area without access to assistance, length of 
displacement, nationality or ethnic group. Besides economic remittances, the transfer of ideas and 
knowledge has the potential to contribute to resolving protracted situations in the longer-term, either from 
diaspora communities or support to other displaced people through refugee-led community-based 
organisations. Engagement by the diaspora or returnees does not only have the potential to enhance 
livelihoods of displaced populations, they also change the context of protracted displacement as such, 
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through engaging politically back home, supporting conflict resolution, reconstruction and peacebuilding 
in the broader sense.  
In line with research results from the region, there is a growing recognition of the role played by migrants 
and refugees in other parts of the region or world for the livelihoods of refugees in protracted 
displacement. In that regard, transnationalism, and in an extension of the concept also translocal 
connections, has been brought forward as a fourth durable solution to protracted displacement. 
Nevertheless, access to those translocal/transnational practices and coping strategies is highly selective 
and differentiated by age, physical ability, gender, economic resources, personal qualities and ‘social 
capital’, nationality of the displaced and duration of displacement. These factors also impact on how and 
if refugees can benefit from certain policies and schemes, such as the Ethiopian out-of-camp policy for 
Eritrean refugees with a minority among them having relatives living outside camps who are able to 
sponsor them. In addition, the use these practices are highly impacted by differences by location, such as 
access to mobile networks and communication technologies, climate and environmental factors. 
Furthermore, some studies point to the fact that that transnational support structures might diminish with 
the long duration of refugees staying in exile while others emphasise that the modalities of support change 
with time from pure financial support to promoting self-sufficiency measures and onward migration. 
Looking at the policy responses to protracted displacement in the region, encampment is still the dominant 
model and return the preferred durable response. Nevertheless, a number of steps have been made to 
promote the self-reliance of refugees pending durable solutions. At the same time, integrated approaches, 
that benefit both host and displaced communities, have gained traction with large differences in scale, and, 
as a result, also the range of actors involved has gradually expanded. The two cases studied in more detail, 
namely responses to protracted displacement in Kenya and Ethiopia, pose the question why the two 
governments have decided to follow diametrically opposed paths towards solution. In that regard, it is 
important to understand that discussions on refugees are informed by a range of constraints and priorities 
that are unrelated to the question of refugees, ranging from security and state capacity to development 
and economic and donor relations. 
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